When Life Depends on a Lottery: The Oakland A's
by dwishinsky on Jan 8, 2012 10:17 AM PST
Email
Print
I like Jonah Keri. I enjoyed his book about the Tampa Bay Rays (The Extra 2%), and I tend to respect his point of view when he writes. But everyone is entitled to be offbase from time to time and Keri's latest article at Grantland, "The Myth of the Small Market Window" is certainly offbase. Inspired by the A's recent purge of Andrew Bailey, Trevor Cahill and Gio Gonzalez, Keri lights into the idea that small market teams have mere windows to compete, he says in his opening,
"Billy Beane loves to talk about Windows. The Window is the short period of time in which small-revenue clubs supposedly have to compete. Right now, the Window is closed in Oakland. The Window was open once, and the A's general manager did everything he could to keep it that way just a little bit longer. But changes in the game, we're told, have made it harder and harder to prop open the Window even a crack … much less wide open, allowing years of fresh air and pennants to waft in.
There is a nugget of truth behind this Window obsession. Smaller-revenue teams have a tougher time signing premium free agents, or retaining their own top players past their initial six years of team control. That puts extra pressure on these poorer teams to bring up a bunch of great prospects all at once, then hope they get good at the same time before they get expensive.
But far more often it's a bullshit excuse. It's a vague, faraway goal that always seems several years out of reach. It's a cover for cheap, greedy ownership, lousy scouting, drafting, and player development, and myopic trades. It's a weak attempt to placate a fan base screwed over by years of management incompetence and indifference."
Well then.
I disagree with what he accuses in his third paragraph quite vehemently. To completely disregard the challenges of having a revenue stream like the A's and feel that they can simply compete on equal footing with the Yankees and Red Sox of the world is dangerously naive. Yet Keri isn't stupid, he seems to get it because the second paragraph hits the nail on its head.
Keri's big argument in many ways surrounds on thing. He may say, "lousy scouting, drafting and player development" but that is all one package right there. If you believe in the predictability of baseball players' future production, a lousy scouting department would lead to a lousy draft as your draft would be filled with lousy players, presumably these lousy players can't suddenly be trained to be very good and thereby it poisons the hope of your player development making them too in turn look lousy.
He says that the problem for Oakland boils down to their inability to find talent. He closes his case with,
"Greater emphasis on young talent by rival teams and a lousy stadium situation might be partly responsible for the A's Window being slammed shut. But the far bigger reason is the same one that has left Pirates fans without fresh air for 20 Bonds-less years, the same one that's got Royals fans only now starting to get a little optimistic after a 26-year playoff drought: The A's have a bunch of cruddy players because management didn't do a good enough job of getting non-cruddy ones."
That begs the question, what makes a good draft? To figure it out first off all I looked at data from 1990-2004 and while I tend to prefer FanGraphs' WAR calculation, for the sake of expediency I used Baseball-Reference's calculation as they have a wonderful draft database that allowed me to find the information I needed. First for a little about the information: one I used every American League team between 1990-2004 (this means for 1996 when the Devil Rays were stocking their farm system they are counted as are the 1996 Milwaukee Brewers though they vacated the AL with the Devil Rays' 1997 arrival). This 15 year block was arbitrary, and I felt that getting closer more recent drafts would complicate matters as many players would just be starting their careers and therefore career WAR numbers would be off. Of course this isn't a foolproof system as there are still players from the 1990 draft who are active and many more from 2004 who are. Secondly there is double counting in these numbers - guys who were drafted by Team A, did not sign, then were drafted by Team B. Their WAR numbers are counted more than once in some instances. However, if looking at the quality of the players chosen, it is both too time-consuming and complicated to figure out who signed/did not sign. While one can fairly argue that a front-office's ability to sign a draft pick is a major part of what makes them good or bad, I wanted to more do an evaluation of talent chosen here, but that is a fair criticism though I don't think it would greatly alter the results or conclusions, it could.
To determine what makes a good draft there are several measures one could look at. Is it more successful if more of your players drafted ultimately end up playing at the highest level - MLB? If that is the case the A's draft of 2002 - the famous "Moneyball draft" was the best in the American League between 1990-2004. Of the 51 players drafted 27% made it to the show including, Joe Blanton, Jonathan Papelbon (who they A's drafted but who did not sign) and Nick Swisher. These players have combined to put up 56.7 WAR in the years since or roughly 1.1 WAR overall the 51 players drafted. But that 56.7 WAR is dwarfed by the combined output of the 1990 Yankee draftees who combined for 120.8 WAR in a draft that featured, Carl Everitt, Andy Pettitte and Jorge Posada. Of the 74 players the Yankees drafted in 1990 they put up an average of 1.6 WAR all said and done while on 18% of them made the bigs. But that number isn't as large as the 1990 Baltimore Oriole class, who had fewer graduate to MLB (15%) but put up 76.0 WAR despite being a class of just 45 draftees making their average pick worth 1.7 WAR in the pros. Yet virtually all of that value came from one guy: Mike Mussina (74.6 WAR).
So which is better? It's hard to say. The Orioles missed on virtually everyone but really hit on one guy. The Yankees above had three very solid players out of 74, and the A's meanwhile graduated a lot of pretty good but not necessarily Hall of Fame bound players (also in the A's example, that WAR number should climb given how many of those players are still playing baseball). This is sort of evidence in and of its of the draft being a crapshoot.
211 teams have drafted in the American League since 1990. The average WAR a team can expect out of their draft class during that period of time is 23.3 WAR. Going from a high of the 1990 Yankees' 120.8 to a low of the 1999 Yankees and 2003 Devil Rays' -4.6 WAR (to further belabor the above point that Devil Rays draft class had one of the highest graduation rates at 24%). During this period of time an American League team could expect that about 13% of the players they drafted would reach the pros. But did some teams do better than others? See for yourself?
|
Team |
Avg % Pro |
St Dev % Pro |
Total WAR |
Avg WAR |
St Dev Avg WAR |
|
13.1 |
4.00 |
305.9 |
20.4 |
19.03 |
|
|
17.0 |
4.77 |
459.7 |
30.6 |
18.31 |
|
|
12.0 |
3.67 |
406.7 |
27.1 |
25.23 |
|
|
Brewers |
8.6 |
1.99 |
162.4 |
23.2 |
25.27 |
|
Devil Rays |
17.6 |
5.10 |
192.0 |
21.3 |
19.48 |
|
11.0 |
3.71 |
293.6 |
19.6 |
25.32 |
|
|
12.0 |
3.50 |
460.2 |
30.7 |
28.23 |
|
|
Orioles |
14.0 |
3.71 |
304.3 |
20.3 |
20.13 |
|
13.1 |
3.86 |
355.7 |
23.7 |
20.32 |
|
|
Red Sox |
14.7 |
4.30 |
362.9 |
24.2 |
15.57 |
|
Royals |
13.0 |
4.93 |
310.4 |
20.7 |
23.99 |
|
11.3 |
3.61 |
259.0 |
17.3 |
14.43 |
|
|
13.8 |
3.23 |
395.7 |
26.4 |
19.47 |
|
|
13.8 |
4.56 |
361.0 |
24.1 |
25.15 |
There is no clear answer. The Mariners clearly found the most talent out of the draft between 1990 and 2004 with an American League leading 460.2 WAR, but then again 104.6 of that comes solely from Alex Rodriguez. The Tigers meanwhile were clearly the worst at 259.0 WAR. But here is whee stuff continues to get complicated. While the Mariners were far better, largely owing to Rodriguez, they had a wide deviation in how much talent they actually got out of the draft with a standard deviation from draft to draft a second worst in the American League 28.2 WAR nearly equal to their 30.7 WAR average. Yet the Tigers were the epitome of consistency, at 14.4 WAR deviation though that number too nearly equaled their 17.3 WAR average draft.
If it is about getting the most players out of your draft to go pro Tampa Bay (17.6%) and Oakland (17%) are tops there. But the results are quite different with Oakland getting 30.6 WAR of talent per draft whereas Tampa Bay just managed 21.3. The point is that there are a lot of numbers on this page that are meaningless.
The draft is a crapshoot. It always has been a crapshoot and will always remain a crapshoot. As Jason Wojciechowski says on his great Beaneball post about the Keri article,
"It's surely not reasonable to simply say "the players coming up aren't as good, so the front office has done a bad job," right? I mean, do you remember how highly Grant Desme was rated before he QUIT BASEBALL TO JOIN THE PRIESTHOOD?
I'm sorry for the allcaps, but my gosh, what a stroke of poor luck. I'm still frustrated about it, which is why I yelled. But anyway, my point is that luck obviously plays a part. There are aspects that are, plain and simple, out of the control of management. How much? I don't know. The issue is that I don't think Keri knows either."
There are mistakes made by every front office. It is clear that pursuing Matt Holliday was a mistake that stalled a rebuild and took valuable pieces away from the A's that could've kept this window of contention open a bit longer. But to argue that there are no windows of contention and that simple greed and stupidity results in a team with a low-revenue from failing to be the Rays of the past year is ridiculous. Agree or disagree with what Beane is doing or has done, having to depend upon the draft for the majority of your talent leaves you victim to a great deal of luck. Lately the A's have been on the bad side of it.
291 comments
|
6 recs |
Do you like this story?
Comments
This stuff gives me fits ...
my context … as a high school baseball coach, I don’t have sabermetrics to back up my eyes. I sometimes wonder if these new ways of assessing player value, are holding the A’s back?
" Sleepy Floyd is Superman!!!"
I don’t see why it would. Poor application of the principles could result in bad drafting, but poor application of any sound principles would result in the same.
And in any case, a huge percentage of teams are using these new ways. It doesn’t differentiate the A’s any longer to the good, but I don’t think we can blame sabermetrics for the bad if everyone’s doing it.
Ah-iggit
Really, I think the sort of thing I learned is...
Even if you scouted in the traditional sense only it still doesn’t necessarily mean you get results.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
But what if the A's are doing basically the same stuff they were doing 10 years ago
And a lot of the other teams have passed them up in the analytical department? Without knowing all the details of what they are doing in their front office, that’s how it seems to me as an outsider.
I don't mean that to say the A's are literally doing everything the same
or that they haven’t learned and advanced, but I can name a good dozen or more teams that I would say are well ahead of the A’s sabermetrically.
Is there something specific the A's aren't doing?
Or is it a matter of bodies? I’m 100% sure the A’s don’t have the largest analytical department in MLB, but how much return does a team get after a certain point?
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 9, 2012 12:35 AM PST up reply actions
The biggest thing is that they're not making use of the new data.
They’re not doing PITCHf/x, HITf/x, or TrackMan in their minor league system. Every team is aware of the PITCHf/x data in the major leagues, but I’m not aware that the A’s are making any particular use of it. I know one of their guys usually comes to the PITCHf/x summits, but they’re held in San Francisco, so they’d almost have to try not to participate. Heck, the Twins have sent people, so that doesn’t prove much.
The very early FIELDf/x development was done in Oakland, but I’m pretty sure they’ve done nothing with it since then. The first install was in AT&T Park and after that in Kauffman Stadium, but I haven’t heard anything about Oakland being near the top of the queue for the next install.
It’s not that I don’t think you can be a successful team without using the new data. The Phillies, Braves, and Rangers do pretty well without it. Clearly, investing in good scouting is very important. But I do think it’s hard to claim to be a leading sabermetric team if you aren’t making good use of the best data sources.
As far as the number of bodies in the analytical department, I'm clearly biased.
I see a lot of return for more good analysts. There is so much data that goes un-analyzed even in the good front offices these days. But I’m far from a neutral opinion on that question.
However, just as a practical matter, all the most successful “sabermetric” teams (Rays, Red Sox, Cardinals) have more bodies in their analytical departments than the A’s do. But whether that proves anything is a separate question. Many of the less successful sabermetric teams also have more bodies in their analytical departments than the A’s do.
I have heard anecdotally that the business side of the team (Crowley et al)
Is reticent to spend on new school stuff, but that could just be rumor. I’m with you; I think the A’s have to be at the head of the curve on data analysis. What the optimal way to do that is, not sure.
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 9, 2012 9:23 AM PST up reply actions
Mike -
I think the analytics etc are extremely useful in the MiLB through to the MLB level. But given that there isn’t that sort of thing available in collegiate or high school ball (to my knowledge at least) do you think the premise that there is so much of the draft that is left up to chance still holds? Or do you think it will be possible for teams to “master the draft” (or do you feel it already has been done perhaps?)
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
That's a tough question to answer well without insider knowledge
Presumably some scouts are better than others and some teams are better than others at figuring out which scouts these are and doing what they need to do to acquire, retain, and motivate them. I have no idea how Oakland has done on that front. I see teams other than Oakland snapping up the good talent evaluators that I know online, but I’m hesitant to read anything into the quality of Oakland’s scouting operation from that.
I do think that in the future, analytics is going to be more helpful in evaluating collegiate talent and perhaps even high school talent prior to the draft. TrackMan is developing a portable unit. Training academies may install PITCHf/x. Teams could conduct workouts in facilities equipped with these types of technologies or even high-speed video. I don’t have any sense that any of this is happening yet.
Analytics are probably currently of some use in evaluating college talent, but I imagine Oakland could be up on those methods as much as anyone else, as I don’t think any teams are incorporating the new data into that evaluation yet.
Question for dwishinsky....
Or anyone else for that matter. Have you looked at a correlation between avg. money spent in the draft by teams and avg. WAR and/or avg. % pro?
B/c I am inclined to agree with your general argument that (all things being equal) the draft is a crapshoot. As it is noted above, when players are as many as 5+ years away from making it to the MLB, so many uncontrollable factors can derail even the perfect prospect’s development.
But I do believe that the draft becomes less of a crap shoot for teams that have had more money to spend and I would be surprised if the teams that have consistently spent more money on the draft over your 1990-2004 sample size didn’t consistently have better draft yields than the ones that were more frugal. But I don’t have any stats to back up that inclination, so I am curious if you or anyone else on this site has looked into that.
I noticed that dwish found Detroit to be the team
with lowest standard deviation in WAR, and Detroit is a team that had a reputation of paying above slot long before it became commonplace.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
I haven't
It is worth a further look though for certain. To iglew’s point of Detroit going above slot. I don’t know if that tendency for them is reflected in this data… isn’t that a more recent phenomena? But one thing I wonder, is the A’s have a relatively low standard deviation too, and I wonder if that is to your point going after guys with a shorter development stage (college players). I see it like that hurricane cone: two weeks out versus two days out. You know have a better sense where it makes landfall.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
What I'm thinking of is not recent.
Since about 2007 or 2008, paying above slot has become widely accepted. Before that is was somewhat taboo and most teams shied away from it, but Detroit was bold.
Rick Porcello was drafted in 2007 as the 27th pick. He definitely fell in the draft. Tigers paid him $3.5 million signing bonus. Compare to some others in the same year #2 Mike Moustakas $4m, #4 Daniel Moskos $2.5m, #9 Jarrod Parker $2.1m, #14 Jason Heyward $1.7m, #26 James Simmons $1.2m.
Detroit’s 1st round picks in 2005 and 2006 were higher — Cameron Maybin #10 in 2005 and Andrew Miller #6 in 2006 — but both were paid above-slot money in order to sign them after being passed up by cheaper teams who couldn’t afford them. That’s three overslot first-round picks in a row. I distinctly remember that in 2007 when Porcello kept falling, it was predicted that he wouldn’t get past Detroit, given their pattern of paying overslot.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
My data is 2004
So Porcello’s 2007 is recent in that context.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
There are two things you're trying to do in signing/drafting young talent
1) Find obviously talented players in obscure places. Latin America was like that for a number of years. If you were the only team in Venezuela, no one else would see some 18 year old hit the ball 500 feet during batting practice. If anyone else had been there to see him, you would have had a problem, but since you were alone you got to sign the guy.
Maybe South Korea or Australia or even Europe could be that way now. I think it’s a lot less likely to work out than before, because travel and video are so available now.
In football, the equivalent is finding a great player at a small school (Charles Haley from James Madison is an example of this).
2) Find players that everyone sees, but be the only one who sees their talent. This is the essence of Moneyball: figure out what actually wins games, and find the guys who do those things without attracting anyone’s attention/money (because they’re short and unathletic-looking like Matt Stairs, or they throw funny like Chad Bradford, or they have a low BA like Jack Cust, or they’ve been injured for a while like Jaha or Thomas). The problem is, as you say, Mike, that a lot of teams have caught up. There are fewer misunderstandings of player value now than in the past, and the hope people held out for statistical analysis of defense hasn’t completely born fruit, I think.
If you can’t do those things, you rely on either huge piles of cash or on draft position to get players that are obviously talented, and whom everyone wants.
"And Julio Franco is batting right-handed!" -- Wayne Hagin, A's radio play-by-play, mid-80s
by Nick on Jan 9, 2012 6:20 AM PST up reply actions 1 recs
Fantastic Point
The theoretical perfection of scouting will be reached when the best pro player gets selected first in the draft, the second-best selected second, and so on.
Obviously we’re nowhere near that point, but I imagine we edge closer and closer every year. The first 15 overall picks pan out better than picks 16-30. And 1st rounders fare better than 2nd rounders. So overall teams are doing a decent job.
The key to Moneyball, which seems misunderstood, is exactly what Nick posted. Being the first team to find that new gold mine of talent. In the 50’s the teams that desegregated started bringing in all kinds of talent. Later on it was found Latin America was a great source of talent. The A’s were one of the first to use advanced mathematical analysis to find yet another source of winning players. In every case the league adjusts, and catches up. Every time another “gold mine” is rushed to ‘till no big “veins” of talent are left. Who knows where the next mine will be found. I just hope we’re the ones to find it. One day there won’t be any mines left.
A variation on #2.
As you say, the playing field has evened out a lot on spotting talent, and there are no obvious “market inefficiencies” left.
I would think a more likely avenue for the next advantage would be to do a better job at recognizing not talent but personality types. Some players have a lot of talent, but don’t have the drive/focus/discipline/zen/whatever that it takes to continue to improve and make the most of their talent. Other players have less talent but somehow manage to get the most out of it. If a team could find a way to identify which are which — which currently looks to me like even more of a crapshoot than identifying talent — that team could enjoy a real advantage.
Another idea would be to do a better job at identifying who is more likely to have a serious injury and who is is less likely, particularly with regard to pitchers.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
This has always been an intriguing idea to me
Ever since I took a product development course at UCD. We took a personality test and were divided into groups based on our personality types. I remember that my personality type happened to be the polar opposite the personality type CEO’s tend to fall into. Pigeonholed to middle-class before I even graduated.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers-Briggs_Type_Indicator
Even reading Moneyball, Lewis talks about Beane’s failure to make it as a player and Beane himself touts the Dykstras and Swishers as the type to be successful. I have to imagine there’s some sort of personality test given to amateur athletes. Although the opportunity to cheat on the test could become an issue if the wrong personality can lead to being skipped in the draft.
Did you ever hear of the the Seattle Seven? ... that was me. And six other guys
I love Myers-Briggs.
We’ve discussed it in Lounge and/or game threads before.
I’m the type that is supposedly best as a “strategist”, same as Nico.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
iglew....
In regards to personality types, I absolutely agree that that this should be the next avenue explored (if teams are not already doing so behind the scenes). I’ve been thinking about this a lot, not just in the context of baseball, but in other sports as well.
For instance, the Raiders recently hired a new general manager Reggie McKenzie. In reading up on him, I seen multiple quotes from Ron Wolf (who has a reputation as one of the best talent evaluators in football history) and other front office people who say, essentially, “a lot of people can fill out a scouting report, but Reggie can tell you can and cannot play.” Embedded in that sort of statement seems to be an inference that there is micro/macro dichotomy in evaluating a player. Many people can learn/be taught how to study and report on a player’s micro traits—i.e. how fast a player is, his mechanics in executing an athletic movement, his ability to catch/field his position, etc.— but that doesn’t tell the whole story. Instead, it is the talent evaluators who demonstrate good intuition in identifying the intangibles of a player— i.e. personality type, etc.— that separates those that can consistently identify future major league talent and those that can’t.
This may be a contentious statement, because we don’t have anything readily available to measure the validity of it. But I do believe that there is research to be done that would help to define and identify personality types that would further help in the process of assessing and distinguishing amateur talents with similar tools. However, until that research is conducted, it is an area where I believe that you have to presume that some scouts are truly better than others at identifying those more nebulous traits (even if that talent evaluator can’t define those observations on paper beyond stating that the player has strong “intangibles” and “knows how to play the game the right way”).
My thoughts on this subject come from the fact that I was a three-sport varsity high school athlete, a two-sport college recruit, and an NCAA D-I scholarship athlete. Despite those achievements, I always felt like my mind got in the way of reaching my peak performance potential in a single sport (I made my conference’s all-rookie team as a freshman, lead the team in points as a sophomore but when it was time to take the next step and turn into an all-conference/all-america performer I couldn’t take that next mental leap and started to decline under the pressure). I found it particularly illuminating when I saw a quote from Michael Taylor. I forgot what the quote was verbatim and am having trouble finding it but he said something to the effect of ‘I would be a much better hitter if I was dumber’. Essentially, his quote suggests that some players can be too analytic and that can have adverse effects on their ability to let instincts and their tools to take over. I’ve always felt that my inconsistency in sports derived from the fact that I was too analytical— and knowing that I was not a unique athlete in that regard, there is a lot of potential benefits to be yielded for the teams that can better define/identify/understand player’s who fit certain personality types (i.e. “too analytical”, “a gamer”, “lacks confidence to capitalize on one’s tools”).
After all, the potential applications from better understanding personality types are obviously numerous: 1) having a better understanding of which players (with similar skills sets) are more likely to succeed and which players (with a given personality type tend to fail); 2) knowing which personality traits/mental blocks that a prospect might possess can be be overcome/corrected and which can’t; 3) MOST IMPORTANTLY, understanding what personality types respond to what type of coaching approaches in the minor league development phase or, more simply, to what extent it even makes a difference; etc.
Again, without quantifiable analysis for non-insiders to sink their teeth in, scouts and coaches with personal knowledge and good intuition will always have an invaluable place in the analytical process of assessing amateur players. At least in the context of prospects/amateur players, It is the reason why I will never wholly dismiss someone who says “stats cannot tell me what my eyes see” or say “even though both these players have the same tools and stats at this level, I am telling you, player X will perform at the major league level but that player Y will not.” Purported talent evaluators simply do not have more than a rudimentary verbiage to describe personality types/intangibles on a scouting report but it DOES NOT mean that certain evaluators are not better than others at identifying those traits.
If teams can do the research, more completely develop the verbiage, and teach more talent evaluators what/how to identify the intangible attributes it has great potential as the next avenue, as you said iglew, to creating a competitive advantage in recognizing and developing prospects.
I think the most intriguing aspect of this
is the possibility of finding useful indicators that are counterintuitive. For example, you might think a smarter person would be a better player, but maybe certain types of stupid really do correlate with a better chance of making it. Or you would think that a guy with strong family support and lots of dedication would be a better player, but maybe some level of distraction or disruption actually correlates with a better chance of making it. Or on the flip side, maybe there’s a real pattern by which certain traits correlate with guys being a bad risk, but if you can identify specific exceptions to that pattern you can pick out specific individuals who are undervalued because of it.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Exactly....
I like how you phrased that, in regards to “indicators that are counterintuitive.” For instance, it would be natural to look at a prospect who has always had success at every level he’s played at and say, he is more likely to be successful at higher levels than another player who, to that point, had struggled at one level that both players had experienced. But that really may not be true depending on the context.
For instance, player X may have been a great prospect in HS and elected to go to college where he continued to be a great prospect. However player Y, with a similar skill set to player X, struggled in high school and into his freshman year in college but then performed well as a soph./jr. and established himself as an similarly great prospect heading into the draft.
A team may feel more comfortable drafting player X because, to that point, he had not shown any signs of failure. However, more research on the subject may prove that player Y is the safer bet to draft because he exhibited the personality trait of “resilience” in facing struggles and being able to make adjustments to overcome them.
After all, a prospect rarely moves through a system without any adversity. And adversity can come in many different unpredictable forms that may or may not have anything to do with a person’s sheer ability to perform at a certain level of competition (i.e. overcoming family/personal life problems, nagging injuries, etc.). But whatever factor, direct or extraneous, might develop along a player’s developmental path to the major leagues, if a player has exhibited the ability to adjust to and overcome some significant struggle, I believe that applicable research would show that that player is more likely to be able to adjust to/overcome any future struggles than the player that has not demonstrated those mental capabilities.
and it's not to say that....
These indicators will prove to be absolute by any means, in respect to an individual prospect. A more successful amateur may just prove to be a better player. A smarter player may prove to just be “cerebral” and “heady” instead of “analytical to a fault.” Or a player with no injury history may just prove to be less injury prone in the long run.
But research might show a counterintuitive trend that is, on average, more likely to result. And if teams understand and apply that to the draft where they select, what? 40-50 players a year— they might, on average, hit on more prospects in the long run.
the struggles of michael taylor might be an exhibit for this theory
the artist formerly known as inbillywetrust
A friend of mine who was a professional athlete
and socialized with other professional athletes even more successful than she, once told me that in her experience most top athletes are either extremely smart or quite dumb without much in between.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
so maybe it has to do with introspection or sensitivity to criticism? i presume the ability to deal with failure is a big part of being successful at baseball. maybe billy beane and michael taylor are just too sensitive?
the artist formerly known as inbillywetrust
This makes sense.
You’re either born with otherworldly talent or you have to be Machiavellian to maximize what you were given. The ability to forget failure and maintain confidence is crucial. In that case, the maintenance of a huge ego would benefit you. Failures are dismissed while wins are normalized.
"When you find your way. Then you see it disappear."
I have heard a similar refrain from athletes as well
That you either can intellectually grasp what you need to do, and are smart enough to make changes to do so (Brandon McCarthy); or, you just do what people tell you to do with good results (Forrest Gump)
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 10, 2012 3:03 PM PST up reply actions
Great Post
To me it seems like there are several key components to building a competitive team for years at a time.
The Draft / International Market – While the A’s don’t have a lot of control over where they pick in the draft, they should prioritize this as the best opportunity to level the playing field with the big boys by allocating resources to identification/development of young talent. Can they spend as much as the big boys on the big league club? No. However, they should be able to come close with the draft/international market. Given, they still need luck to hit on those impact-level players.
Free Agency – The A’s cannot attract or afford to pay market $ for top-tier free agents, nor can they afford to miss on the ones that they do acquire (ignoring injured/elderly reclamation projects). This puts them at a HUGE disadvantage compared to the high payroll clubs, especially with the recent spending limits implemented in the draft & international markets.
Retention of Current Players – Similar to the free agent situation, the A’s simply can’t miss on the select players that they try to extend past arbitration/free agency. We’ve all seen what one significant miss (Eric Chavez) can do to handcuff the team for years. Other clubs can afford to swing and miss with a few here and there…not the A’s.
While I agree with Keri that there are things the A’s can do better, their competitive window will continue to be brief followed by years of futility unless additional revenue streams are realized. I think we’ll see this prove true for the Rays in a few years as well.
Business man by day, fearless couch guardian by night.
I think you are right.
You acknowledge correctly I believe that the A’s can’t play in free-agency. Retention is a huge difficulty for low-revenue teams somewhere where the Rays are doing a good job with their option laden extensions. That is something Oakland can do better but then again, it isn’t everything. Ultimately the Rays have hit it in the draft.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Good post
I think it is clear that we need a new stadium to compete
Check out my Cycling blog http://cyclebee.blogspot.com/
by Athletic on Jan 8, 2012 11:38 AM PST via mobile reply actions
I'm not entirely sure that is the silver bullet
But it certainly wouldn’t hurt either.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Comparing draft results
I agree that drafting is a crapshoot. I don’t think most writers, even the sabermetric ones, really appreciate how true that is. But in particular, I think what really gets unappreciated is how extremely top-heavy MLB drafts are.
If you have a run of success like the A’s did in the early aughts, you’re going to be drafting in the 20s. In that range, your odds of getting a solid MLB regular are about 1 in 5. Think of that this way: if you’re drafting in the 20s, and you pick one Cliff Pennington in the first round every five years, you’ve had average draft results. That’s right: four busts and one Cliff Pennington is completely normal.
So, in this regard, I don’t think it’s really fair to compare one team’s raw draft results to another’s, because some teams have higher picks than other teams. Can’t knock the A’s for not drafting an ARod; they never had a shot at him.
A better way would be to add up and average the WAR from each draft slot. Then see how much above/below slot expectation each team has done. (I’m pretty sure I’ve seen something like this on Baseball Prospectus before).
But even then, it’s still a bit of a crapshoot. What Seattle had the first pick in some other year, besides the ones where Griffey and ARod were sitting there as an obvious first pick? If they draft first in 1994 instead of 1993, they could have taken all ten of the first picks in the draft (Paul Wilson, Ben Grieve, Dustin Hermanson, Antone Williamson, Josh Booty, McKay Christiansen, Doug Million, Todd Walker, CJ Nitkowski and Jaret Wright) and they would have only gotten about 15% of the total WAR that ARod has provided.
To really get this, go to Baseball Reference and click through the drafts, and look at the names that are drafted between #20 and the end of the first round. Year after year, it’s really one fringy backup after another.
If you depend on the draft, and you’re drafting in the 20s, you may get lucky in one period and hit on 2 out of 5, but in another period you’ll hit on zero. And then your farm system is going to dry up. That’s how the system works.
If pitching is an art, batting is criticism. The batter's job is to destroy every cliche he sees.
by kenarneson on Jan 8, 2012 12:29 PM PST reply actions 1 recs
Very true.
There are far more detailed methods of analysis. I looked at draft classes for my breakdown. But even then remember Brien Taylor, Bryan Bullington were both overall #1’s. There is a top heavy approach to things and that is reflected when I look at the data, which I may expand in the future to look at the previous year’s record. Eyeballing it, it seems the only two playoff teams in the top 20 come in at 19 and 20 (the ’02 Athletics class and ’96 Mariners class)
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Ken, do you know if anyone has done the reverse analysis of WAR and draft slot?
That is, has anyone looked at a year or two or 5 of WAR numbers in the majors and asked, “Where did this WAR come from?” Take, I dunno, the top 50 players each year in the majors for 10 years and find out what their draft position is? This would be roughly like the thing you hear about in the NFL all the time, “Such-and-such team is starting 8 1st-round picks,” or when they talk about how many McDonald’s All-Americans are on Duke or Kansas.
"And Julio Franco is batting right-handed!" -- Wayne Hagin, A's radio play-by-play, mid-80s
I cant find it.
There was something done by Beyond the Box Score that showed it though… ugh. Anyone know what I am talking about?
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Rany Jayazerli's study was at BtBS, but I think
maybe you’re thinking of Victor Wang’s at THT.
I linked both of them here.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Hmmm...
Nope it isn’t either of those two.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Glassheart did this in the fanpost section, and did a great job with it.
Conclusion – even more of a crapshoot than I thought.
by Billy Frijoles on Jan 9, 2012 11:15 AM PST up reply actions
I did a similar study
of AL Draft and looked at years 1999-2006 and wanted to see how teams recognized talent and how they cultivated it once signed.
This was done prior to the 2011 season and didn’t want the % of players stat watered down by including the 2007/2008/2009 drafts…wanted all orgs time to allow players to sink or swim so to speak before adding them in.
The data showed how much WAR the drafts produced including players not signed by the org or dealt prior to appearing with drafting club.
I then parsed out the WAR of the draft picks realized in the team that drafted them.
I used rWAR as well for ease of the calculation.
The A’s finished first in overall WAR and WAR realized in A’s uniform.
http://tribetalk365.blogspot.com/2010/10/american-league-draft-war-review.html
Very cool
Liked the article. Thank you for the link!
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
whoa
The Angels originally drafted Buster Posey? That could have been bad.
You have to include smiley faces - Poppy
;- ) :- ) :-O : -> : -] : -}
I don't understand how anyone can hate on Lew Wolff.
He looks like Clarence the angel.
"The Lord has blessed us with birthday cake!"
by ozzman99 on Jan 8, 2012 1:14 PM PST reply actions 1 recs
And you don't understand why we hate Angels here??
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
As a group, I hate the Angels as much as the next guy.
But Clarence is a different case.
"The Lord has blessed us with birthday cake!"
My thoughts on Keri:
I guess I’d put it this way: If you are a small market GM and you are AWESOME, say, a 97-100 on a 1-100 scale, then yes you can field a great team every year. Large to Mid Market GMs could be like a 70 and still accomplish this. Is a small market GM who is, say, 89-92 making excuses when he says there is a small market window? I guess so, but it seems silly to dog on a guy about that.
The glare was not practiced. I would get into the game situations, and when that happens, there comes a level of concentration that most can only imagine but can never achieve. You become what you are doing, and that is what you see on my face. -Dave Stewart
by Hegenberger Road on Jan 8, 2012 1:36 PM PST reply actions
I will always dog on anyone who makes excuses about doing a crappy job
If it’s so f’in hard, quit. I’d have had a talk with Beane the first time he did that. The second time he’d have been gone.
It’s a cover for cheap, greedy ownership, lousy scouting, drafting, and player development, and myopic trades.
This is all true. Going back to 1990 obscures the fact that Beane has been GM only since 1998. How would the numbers change if you measured since 1998? What about since 2005, when the players drafted might still be in their prime?
This “crapshoot” thing is just crap. Yes, a particular draft pick or draft can have a wide variance in outcomes. If you look at who’s done the best over an extended period of time, it’s not anywhere near as much of a crapshoot. It’s like saying hitting is a crapshoot because Albert Pujols and Kevin Kouzmanoff may or may not get a hit in any one particular AB.
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 8, 2012 1:46 PM PST up reply actions 1 recs
Well...
You write “if it is so hard, quit”. Then every MLB GM should quit because no one has mastered the draft.
For my data between 1998-2004 Beane averaged 29.7 WAR per draft class. You can’t compare really newer years as there is a bias towards older data (more full careers in 1990 and 1991, more partial careers from 2005 – on) which is why I chose it. The point is irrelevant though as you have wild swings in production from class to class (see the high standard deviations that nearly equal the averages consistently).
To say that the crapshoot is crap – I ask you, find me the GM who has done well over time. I have all the data and am happy to share it with you, but the lowest standard deviation in WAR is Detroit and they’ve had poor classes vis-a-vis most other MLB teams. You say, I am obscuring things by going back to 1990 then you say its best to look “over an extended period of time”.
Also to look at classes of 50 players I think isn’t the same at all at looking from at bat to at bat. And furthermore I aggregate it. If you want the data to prove a point I’m happy to share because to me the data says a lot of nothing.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Not every GM should quit, only those who whine that their job is too hard
OK, let’s say you’re right. The draft is a crapshoot. Then why not hire the cheapest GM you can find? Why give some random guy 4% of the team’s equity? Are you saying Wolff is a fool?
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 8, 2012 5:27 PM PST up reply actions
There is more to building a team than the draft.
Is the simple response.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Especially since the draft is run by the director of scouting, not the GM (on most teams, anyway).
"The Lord has blessed us with birthday cake!"
True, though I appreciate the "buck stops here" mentality
But regardless, it seems quite clear no team or GM has mastered the draft. If someone can prove otherwise, I’m happy to be shown the winning strategy.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Simple, but incomplete. What value is Beane adding outside the draft to make
him worth tens of millions of dollars more than, say Forst?
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 9, 2012 9:10 AM PST up reply actions
That's a fair question.
Do I think if Forst took over he’d run the team into the ground? No. But regardless, that isn’t the point I am trying to make. All I am saying is drafting players is so inexact a science to be little more than hopeful guesswork.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
It could maybe be noted
for whatever good it might be, that Grady Fuson, who was somewhat maligned in the Moneyball book and movie as being too “old school” is back with the A’s as a “special advisor” because Beane finally recognized that stats will only take you so far.
How much of that is relevant? I think a lot, but I KNOW nussink.
Waddell....
I guess how I ideally judge a GM is in their ability to consistently allocate resources to the different parts that go into building a successful team than other available people could. Obviously, GMs are given a certain amount of money to build a team. One GM may elect to commit a substantial amount of those resources to the major league roster and free agency, while another GM might elect to spend less on the MLB roster/FA and commit more of those resources to scouting, player development (in the form of quality minor league coaches) and the draft. The assumption is that he is paid much more than any of his subordinate front office personnel because he is that much better than Forst, or any of the other available front office personnel, at managing/allocating the money allotted to him to construct a team.
Whether that is truly the case, for Beane vs. Forst, is almost impossible to answer from an outside perspective, imo. But given that the draft is only one slice of the pie where a good GM can add significant value in building a successful team— the most important thing for us to keep in perspective is that we cannot say, ‘Beane has not selected the right players in the draft, therefore, many other GMs or front office executives could do a better job at building a successful team than him.’ It seems that Keri is making that claim here, and it is why I agree with dwishinsky that it is short-sided.
by infinitejest on Jan 9, 2012 10:24 PM PST up reply actions
Let's say Beane is a lot better than Forst. But if it's true that his being better
doesn’t matter since luck is far and away the most important thing, why not hire Forst? He’s just as likely to get lucky as Beane, no? Why pay Beane 4% of the team when Forst would probably do the job for $300K or something? The results would be about the same, no?
I don’t think Keri is saying many other GMs could do the job. I see him saying that at least one other team is doing the job (you can add Texas and Milwaukee), and that it’s not impossible.
Last but not least, Beane’s incessant whining and making excuses really grates on me, and makes me not respect him as a professional. I didn’t hear one peep out of Dave Littlefield no matter how crappy people thought he was. He never said “my bosses gave me no budget”.
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 12:40 AM PST up reply actions
Well here's where I diverge....
On the wholesale statement that the draft is a crapshoot— I think it is largely a crapshoot if every team spends the same. I think the teams whose top scouts were the strongest would do better than others at the top of the draft because, presumably, their top scouts would be focusing most of their scouting efforts on the players who they might select with their top picks. But , overall, each team’s draft would yield similar results along the lines of total WAR and Avg. % Pro b/c there are SO MANY amateurs to scout and therefore the field is rife for misevaluation if the weaker of the team’s scouts are assigned to evaluate/crosscheck a player (or even if a top scout only has one opportunity to view a less heralded player, sees him on an off day, and then writes him off). So, to the extent that varying draft budgets are not a factor, I subscribe to the theory that the draft (at least past the first 2 or 3 rounds) is a crapshoot.
But where I diverge on the crapshoot theory, is that different teams draft budgets have been widely different from others in a given year— and I find it hard to believe that a 10mil. draft budget will not consistently yield more major league talent than a 3mil. budget annually.
A bigger budget can presumably means bringing in more seasoned/reputable scouts who can evaluate a wider collection of players on multiple occasions. In years past, a bigger budget could have meant that you could go overslot for a first round talent in the later rounds (thus, you spread the risk of failure by having multiple “first rd. talents” in your draft class instead of 1). A bigger budget can simply mean that more overall selections sign in a given year sign and, therefore, on the basis of volume, there is a greater chance that a team has more hits. So if a team is applying a bigger budget to some or all of these aspects to the draft than other teams, that is where (for me at least) the argument that the draft is a crapshoot starts to fall apart some.
by infinitejest on Jan 10, 2012 2:24 AM PST up reply actions
OK so the A's should hire a cheap GM and increase the draft budget?
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:56 AM PST up reply actions
Separating responses so as not to muddle things....
Going back to GM’s and the concept of their “added value” in a draft— a GM has to make all these micro decisions (as highlighted above, even when a team says we are are going to have a bigger draft budget, what do they mean? more scouts? more overslot signees? more signees overall?). It is in those management decisions where I think most GMs tend to separate themselves and “add value” in ways that the people under them are either incapable and/or unseasoned enough to do a similar job.
Look, I get how people are irked at BB’s recent statements that amount “crying poor” or “whining.” But it is so incongruent with BB’s general “I love being the underdog” mentality that it must be part of an ownership directive to create a public image that the A’s NEED a new stadium (so Keri’s right to that extent, imo). But I think the recent public spin has nothing to do with an attempt to divert focus from the A’s failure to develop hitters in recent years or anything else that could be construed as a failure by Beane. It’s just not the type of GM we’ve come to know over the years. So I’m more willing to let it go and just accept that there are so many things at-play behind the scenes right now that are driving this current mess.
by infinitejest on Jan 10, 2012 2:45 AM PST up reply actions
He did make the statement after a playoff loss early in the 2000s
that things might be different if he had a $75M payroll. It’s not all recent whining. But I’m willing to believe that ownership is encouraging his public statements.
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:59 AM PST up reply actions
I don't think Beane does "love being the underdog".
I think he said no to Boston because he wanted to stay in California when his daughter was still in school, he prefers the weather here, and he liked the mellow atmosphere where he could come to work in his shorts. I think the whole “underdog” thing just grew out of the Moneyball mythos.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
FWIW, I don't think Beane is whining because it's part of his personality or whatever
He’s doing it at the behest of ownership, who clearly want a stadium above all else.
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 10, 2012 7:56 AM PST up reply actions
That would explain the whining that it's hard being a small market GM
at least in part. It doesn’t really explain the statements to the effect that people don’t trade the way he’s used to anymore.
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:59 AM PST up reply actions
He's right, though; MLB seems to have become a permanent buyers' market for trades
In which the buyers are perfectly willing to either acquire the MLB talent they want using the MiLB chips they want to use, or by hoarding the prospects they have. Prospects are clearly overvalued, which makes trading in this current environment rather hostile.
I’m not the only one who believes this, either . So, if a team can’t sign upper echelon talent as an FA, and trading for it becomes increasingly risky, what are they to do?
You’ll probably hate me for saying this, but I like that the team is doubling-down on San Jose right now. It’s really the only way they’re going to figure what to do going forward.
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 10, 2012 12:41 PM PST up reply actions
I'm not going to hate you no matter what
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 2:23 PM PST up reply actions
Good
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 10, 2012 3:09 PM PST up reply actions
This.
It’s just PR. Beane is rebuilding because he needs to rebuild. Beane has a bad record recently because he took some gambles and his crapshoots went craps.
Aside from making it hard to attract free agents like Beltre and Furcal, the stadium has little to do with that. It’s just that they have to spout some sort of BS to the fans, and since the stadium thing is the current talking point, that’s what he focuses on.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
I realize this nitpick is not key to your general argument, but
I’m pretty sure David Forst would not do the A’s GM job for $300K. Among other things, I’m pretty sure he could command a lot more than that elsewhere.
(Grover, on the other hand, I think would take the job for $300K….)
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
That's only because you live in the IE
Apartments there are like $450
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 10, 2012 3:04 PM PST up reply actions
Yeah but it cost me $25K in tattoos to fit in
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
I'll be waiting for your LA Ink episode to show up on my DVR
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 10, 2012 7:05 PM PST up reply actions
You're saying he makes more than $300K now?
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 2:24 PM PST up reply actions
While I would be happy to be the lowest paid GM
I can understand why one who is professionally doing this and is well-regarded would not take a big-time below market contract.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
So, they only chase the big bucks.
What a no-good bunch of Beltres. :)
"Trying not to rec a "F**k the Giants" post is like trying not to look at boobs."-anonymous
"i guess i just like beer"-stm
I'm still not seeing how your thesis that player acquisition is
largely luck is compatible with paying the current high market salaries for a GM. Why not offer Forst a raise to $300K and give him the job as opposed to paying Beane 4% of the team? Why not scrimp? it could be the new market efficiency.
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 3:07 PM PST up reply actions
I wouldn't be surprised if Forst
makes $300K in his current position.
If not, I’ll bet he could get that elsewhere. He’s a cum laude from Harvard. Those guys can usually get the big bucks.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
OK substitute Kubota for Forst
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:36 PM PST up reply actions
Or substitute Current Salary +10% for $300K
whichever you prefer. It’s going to be a lot less than 4% equity in the team.
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:39 PM PST up reply actions
I believe the draft is largely based on luck
You keep conflating that with the entire role of general managers which I don’t think is entirely luck driven.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
I'm doing that because most player acquisition is through
the draft, IFA and trades. If the draft is luck, then you must surely think IFA are luck. That leaves trades. Unless you’re absolutely stupendous at trading you’re not likely going to make up for unlucky drafting and IFA signings.
What is Beane doing to earn the millions in your view?
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:37 PM PST up reply actions
Negotiating salaries with players' agents?
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Really? You think he's millions of dollars better
than Forst each year at that?
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:40 PM PST up reply actions
And walking Chavvy's dog.
Hey, I’m not taking a position on how many millions he’s worth — I think a lot of CEO types are overpaid. I’m just trying to identify things that a GM does besides draft and trade.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
I thought it was mostly acquiring players
for the major and minor league rosters. If player acquisition is a crapshoot, and any professional negotiator is about the same at negotiating player salaries, I’m not sure what that leaves.
Personally I believe that player acquisition is not a crapshoot, so a consistently successful GM is worth a lot, but that’s not the thesis presented here.
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:46 PM PST up reply actions
That would be like the anti-"Extra 2%"
The Rays’ operating strategy, according to Keri, is to scrimp on expensive players but spend money on relatively cheap things, like better scouting, baseball intelligence in terms of manpower, and analysis. If players come out to something $4.75M/WAR and baseball operations staff is like $300K/WAR (just making that last one up), it behooves a team to spend as much as possible on those operational tweaks.
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 10, 2012 7:14 PM PST up reply actions
This is the most sensible sounding thing I've read here.
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:42 PM PST up reply actions
So pay Cup $300K to be GM then?
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
I doubt he'd want to take the pay cut from his current job
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:47 PM PST up reply actions
only if I can work from home
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 11, 2012 12:58 AM PST up reply actions
It's an unfair Business
Oakland Athletics could’ve been competitive before all the trades this year if they signed David Dejesus, Josh Willingham, Prince Fielder, Jason Kubel, Albert Pujols, Jose Reyes, and Aramis Ramirez. The teams payroll would even be near their neighbors, the San Francisco Giants at $130 million a year. The problem is ownership would lose a lot of money doing it because of the location that they play at.
Baseball is an unfair business. However, what’s dumbfounding to me is that baseball would probably make more money overall if they let the Athletics move to San Jose. But as the Athletics stand now, they revenue $160m a year and that number is on the downturn in Oakland. And if you can’t have positive net income where you play at whether you win or lose, it’s time to build a new stadium or contract.
David Dejesus
does nothing to towards making teams competitive – that is why only non-competitive, non-contending teams acquire him: Royals, A’s, Cubs. No doubt he will sign with the Mariners or Astros next year!
by oakballnack on Jan 10, 2012 11:17 AM PST up reply actions
Yeah he does nothing.
He is only a solid to above-average starting RF… what good is that right?
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
I wouldn't call a 3 WAR player, which is what he's been at his best an above average
starter when that’s basically the level of average starters since 2006. If you consider him more of a 2-3 WAR player, I’d call him below average for a starter and above average for a role player.
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:49 PM PST up reply actions
Fangraphs defines average WAR as "An average full-time position player is worth 2 WAR"
Greater than 2.0 therefore is above average: 2005 (4.0), 2006 (4.4), 2008 (2.5), 2009 (3.7), 2010 (2.6), 2011 (2.2). Full season worth less than 2.0 2007 (1.7) and sort of 2004 (96 games – 0.9) . That seems consistently above average to me, and a real waste of talent should he be used as a role player.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
You're selling but I'm not buying
I don’t think you’ll find any “formula” that doesn’t yield the result that it’s a crapshoot, and I think there’s a reason for that: prospect evaluation is more about intangibles than anything else, i.e. motivation, personality, potential for a breakthrough, pitching or hitting form, injury possibility, etc) and while toolishness is extremely important because it gives you potential upsides, there are so many other factors that play into how successful a player might be.
Also, just looking at WAR doesn’t tell you much of anything because, to name two A’s examples, Desme quit (who could expect that?) and Harden, who had the potential to be a Cy Young winner, fell by the wayside with injuries after he hit the majors.
But the question is whether a team can make smarter choices and have greater success than they’re having given their draft status, which really comes down to who are the scouts and what are they doing?
I think the real problem is that no matter what, you won’t find a formula in your little black bag. Doesn’t mean that individuals out in the real world aren’t better at scouting than other individuals, just that I think you’re looking in the wrong places.
You miss the point
I’m not saying anything about scouting versus sabermetrics. Given that this looks from 1990-2004, one can argue this actually more heavily tilts towards scouting as being the lone premise. But you do hit the point directly with injuries, priesthood, etc all adding the crapshoot nature of things. Nick Adenhart could’ve had a brilliant career, but he was killed by a drunk driver. Or Brien Taylor shreddng his shoulder, etc. That’s why to say it is as simple as “drafting better” isnt valid. Your philosophy doesn’t matter at all. It is largely dependent upon luck.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Nope, you haven't proven that it's "largely dependent upon luck"
There’s no question that luck counts. So what you have to do is remove all the “unlucky” players from the equation, and then see what happens. So, let’s look at the 1996 draft. The Brewers took Chad Green at #8; the A’s took Eric Chavez at #10. Chad Green never got got more than a taste of AAA until he was beyond prospect age, when it was too late. Chavez became a major force with the Oakland A’s within three years of being drafted.
Looking at Wikipedia, Chad Green was a bust. He did not have any injuries. He just plain sucked and tooled in the minors for a few years before hanging up his cleats.
Sorry, this doesn’t sound like “luck” to me. It sounds like the A’s made a good choice, and Milwaukee made a bad one given the available players Milwaukee had to choose from (it was a pretty poor year, but the Brewers could have chosen Mark Kotsay or Braden Looper or Jake Westbrook or Jason Marquis. But they chose an outfielder who sucked.
That doesn't prove anything.
It isn’t just injuries. It is the trying to predict things 5 years in the future. It is a completely inexact science proven by the fact that every team has failures in the first round. Guys who never make it period. Yet there are Mike Piazzas (6th from the last pick in the entire draft – 1390th Overall and a likely HOFer)
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
So why bother with scouts at all?
Look, you’re making conclusions based on public information. You don’t know which scouts made which recommendations. You don’t know which scouts might have their own keys to unlocking whether a prospect will grow or mature or not.
This is an inexact science, based probably as much on intuitive sense as on anything else, because the kind of prediction you’re talking about is impossible because of injury and other factors. But that doesn’t make it a simple crapshoot, unless you’re trying to justify why the A’s haven’t been able to come up with a decent farm system without trading away their best players.
What I’m saying is that, at least a couple of years ago according to Michael Lewis, NOBODY has gone back and specifically examined the results of scouts’ work. Finding an outlier talent is luck; dealing with injury is luck. But making smart choices is NOT luck.
So then
Answer me: who is making smart choices? What evidence matters other than results?
Furthermore you write “This is an inexact science, based probably as much on intuitive sense as on anything else, because the kind of prediction you’re talking about is impossible because of injury and other factors. But that doesn’t make it a simple crapshoot, unless you’re trying to justify why the A’s haven’t been able to come up with a decent farm system without trading away their best players.”
First off how is it not a crapshoot? Its educated guesses. All of it. Otherwise we’d see consistency somewhere, anywhere, which we don’t see. Furthermore your statement about the farm system is frankly false unless you are using some metric I am unfamiliar with.
What is a smart choice though? Explain it to me and who is making the smart choices and what is the evidence of that?
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Evidence
Again, you’d have to examine the records of individual scouts and put them in the context of the larger flow of any given draft class. And you’d have to examine the records, not of each team, but of each General Manager to see how they stack up against other GMs. That would give you answers. But with the information you have at hand, that doesn’t exist.
So to say that it’s a “crapshoot” means simply that you don’t think any additional knowledge would help make the A’s a better drafting team.
I think this is excuse-making.
Keri's article says that it is the GM's fault
The GM oversees everything. The idea that an individual scout is responsible for all the success or failure is really ridiculous. Don’t you think these scouts if they were finding non-stop successful players would be known? Versus all these other ones who are finding the 50 or so clunkers per team that never make the pros?
I can send you the data, you can look at it based upon general manager stretches. I think you’ll be surprised by the amount of variation. For example Gene Michael during his 1991-1995 tenure with the Yankees goes: 1.1, 74.9, -5.5, -1 to 48.9. Michael is lauded as being the architect of the Yankees dynasty of 1996-2001.
Thats kind of how every team goes. Regardless of their GM’s. If that is true on a macro level, it has to be true on the micro level. Someone finds a 40 WAR player on year and clearly does not the next.
I am happy to have you tell me a general manager you think is drafting consistently better than everyone else and look into it.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Once again....
There has been no public study on the success rate of scouts and their suggestions. So even if there’s no statistical evidence regarding particular GM’s (and I’m not familiar enough with all GM’s to make any statement one way or the other), that says nothing about scouts. And you’re assuming that those scouts “would be known.” Maybe yes, maybe no. That’s a guess you’re making.
In fact, this entire conversation is about guesswork, which is why the line about it being a “crapshoot” is just that, a line. It might be true, or it might not. Seems to me, in regard to pitching, that the A’s tend to do a very good job of evaluation because the record is very good - not merely for drafted pitchers but for pitchers who come via trade. Yes, there are some big blunders, like James Simmons. But by and large, if the A’s trade for a pitcher, that pitcher will probably either wind up pretty good, or will wind up gone pretty quickly.
So why wouldn’t that be true for some teams, for position players?
In fact....
It may be that Beane does know that the A’s suck (or have sucked) at a strategy for position players, but have an excellent record when it comes to pitching - so why not stockpile pitching, and then trade for position players who are close to MLB-ready?
You are just setting up a strawman
There are very well things that are public. The results. We watch the games etc. There is proof that specific scouts miss. If the entire 50+ player draft class of a team puts up a strand of WAR’s like what I mentioned earlier: 1.1, 74.9, -5.5, -1 to 48.9. They aren’t hitting everytime. You’d see more consistency, or if not at the very least you see a consistent baseline.
To illustrate my point, if a team fails to hit home runs but always has at like 60 that can be care of the one guy who year in year out hits 30. If that number goes from 23 to 193 to 13 etc. You know nobody is consistently hitting 30 home runs on that team. The evidence IS there. To say there isn’t any evidence because one can’t see inside the scouting office is sort of nonsensical. What more evidence is there than watching guys play? And if teams are falling below a certain threshold, it isn’t like there is a scout consistently finding 30 WAR players, and there are overwhelming numbers of negative WAR that turns that into -4.3 masking their brilliance to outside eyes…
No as to your point of a strategy for position players, I think developing pitchers is different than developing hitters and think that with hitters you more or less aren’t going to see much change whereas pitchers who tinker a lot and consistently try new grips, arm slots, etc so I just don’t buy that argument.
But basically, your argument (which seems to be attacking me on sabermetrics at times, consistently going back to scouting/scouts etc) boils down to you think that there are teams that have mastered the draft right and can consistently outperform others. So then my question is why aren’t they? And who are they? I haven’t seen any performances that prove that.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
I think the answer to that is partly given in a later post, above...
…that the A"s aren’t making full use of the statistical tools at their disposal, and that some teams are better at analysis and scouting than others, i.e. the Twins, Phillies, Rangers and Rays. I’m not attacking you on sabermetrics, by the way. I think you’re trying to prove statistically what may not be proven statistically based on what we know or what’s available.
I think the most obvious way the A’s have failed is when you look at the best Rule V draft I’ve ever seen. The A’s had first pick; the two next picks were of Soria and Josh Hamilton, and the A’s found a way to move to the top, and picked Goleski. That’s not a crapshoot; that’s not dumb luck.
But the Rule V and Building Via the Amateur Draft are two different things
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Scouting is scouting
Obviously it’s easier to figure out someone who is closer to MLB-ready - but scouting is scouting.
Teams aren't built via the Rule V.
Apples and oranges.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
I try not to criticize sloppy grammar or typos,
but I honestly can’t figure out what the first two sentences in your second paragraph are trying to say.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Yeah not my clearest sentences haha
“To illustrate my point, if a team fails to hit home runs but always has at like 60 that can be care of the one guy who year in year out hits 30. If that number goes from 23 to 193 to 13 etc. You know nobody is consistently hitting 30 home runs on that team.”
The point is trying to say. If you hit 60 home runs a year as a team – there can be a guy on that club who consistently hits 30 a year. If you go to 23 home runs, to 193 home runs, to 13 as a team (or aggregate) then clearly there is no one guy performing at a 30 home run a year level.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
The problem is externalities, man, not scout
As Moneyball the movie parodied, there are definitely scouts out there who are using crusty methods to evaluate players. The players themselves, despite there being a rule against this, are also in contact with teams who undoubtedly offer various handshake perks. The players also have girlfriends/wives, family, and friends who play a role in where they sign, meaning they end up somewhat more randomly distributed than players who are simply picked and signed in order of talent.
Don’t get me wrong; picking early is always better than picking late. But even if you scout the right guy, offer him good money, and pay for his hookers the next time he’s in Davenport, IA, you still might not get him to player major league baseball on your team.
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 9, 2012 12:51 AM PST up reply actions
Which is why....
You have to go beyond statistics. Who are the scouts who made the right choices but didn’t get the guys to sign? This kind of information. Who was on a team’s wish list but they couldn’t sign who went on to greatness?
There’s so much going on here that can’t be put into a little box titled “crapshoot.” If you’ve drawn together the best people around you, and created the best analytical algorithm, then I suspect you’d have greater success than a mere crapshoot.
But baseball doesn’t work like that, or hasn’t. And as has been noted today, even a team like the A’s, noted for sabermetric prowess, is unable to put out the money to use that particular tool.
i don't think scouting can be taught. it's innate. it's like saying you could be warren buffett by sitting at his knee for 20 years. i doubt it.
the artist formerly known as inbillywetrust
On some level, it's innate
It’s like everything else, though. If you follow the Warren Buffett of scouting around for ten years, and you’re smart and intuitive, you’ll probably do a better job than you would if you followed some guy who just looked at the player’s tools and body type.
One question is whether there could possibly be a database that would give you results that veered success in your direction, or not, some kind of magic bullet that gave you an edge, luck notwithstanding.
It’s clear, say, that the folks on the A’s who saw something in Ryan Goleski that they didn’t see in Josh Hamilton were dead wrong, and that the Reds knew what they were doing when they chose Hamilton over Soria.
First off...
The Goleski doesnt matter here. I am arguing the amateur draft not the Rule V. I think the Rule V can be used more effectively, I was surprised they didn’t go after anyone at all this year.
But still, if it is as simple as you profess. Why is no team consistently succeeding at the draft? That simply hasn’t happened. Explain why that is to me if there is a set of skillls as evaluators that leads to success in your mind.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Rule 5 is not cost-effective.
First and most important, to keep a Rule 5 guy you have to keep him on your 25-man roster all year long. Space on the active roster is a precious resource, one of the firmest limiting factors in all of MLB, so you don’t want to waste it on a guy who doesn’t warrant the spot. And the vast majority of guys who are Rule 5 eligible don’t warrant it.
Second, if you do claim a guy in Rule 5, you pay the other team $50,000, and when you return him you only get $25,000 back. Admittedly, $25,000 isn’t a whole lot in MLB terms, but it’s still enough that you don’t want to go tossing around draft picks on guys you’re 99% sure you won’t keep.
A Rule 5 eligible player is one who didn’t make a team’s 40-man roster. I know it’s an oversimplification, but roughly speaking that means that a pick is only worth it if another team’s 41st best guy is better than your team’s 25th best guy. That’s a pretty steep discrepancy. Yes, the teams are unbalanced, but they’re not that unbalanced. I think it makes perfect sense that Rule 5 is something that is used only modestly with only a handful of big scores.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
True
Not everyone will find Roberto Clemente. But I have to think that on the list of eligible players that one might’ve been better than someone we already had on our 40-man roster It also isn’t necessarily the 41st best player either: see – Doolittle or Figueroa who likely aren’t better than many off the 40-man. I just think there is SOMETHING to be gained there, especially in a year of non-contention it is worth a shot.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
40-man vs 25-man
I have no doubt that there were plenty of players eligible in the Rule 5 draft that are better than guys on our 40-man roster. Our roster is pretty crappy.
But to keep a Rule 5 selection, we would have to keep him on our 25-man roster all year long. That’s a huge difference.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Oh I know
But it isn’t necessary a 41st best player you are getting. You might be getting a 28th best. Then 28th best going onto the 25-best, isn’t such a big difference.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
I don't understand.
Why would any team fail to protect its 28th best player? What motive do they have to put an inferior player on their 40-man and leave Mr 28 exposed?
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Well...
Players do not necessarily need to be on the 40-man roster. Michael Choice is neither on the 40-man roster nor is he Rule V eligible. So, the 40-man roster is not the 40-most valuable players in the organization.
Further, when I say 28th “best”. Best isn’t an exact term. For example, I may want Adam Rosales more today than tomorrow. But I get someone who has a higher ceiling and deal wiht a crappy year in MLB because I think ultimately he rises to that level. (today seems to be a David is unclear day, so pardon me if this fails to make sense – but I hope it does).
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Maybe usefulness is better than "best"
As a ranking.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Choice isn't even in the discussion.
He’s Rule 5 ineligible because he hasn’t been around long enough.
We’re talking about the universe of players who have the necessary service time. Anyone else would never be on the roster in the first place and doesn’t enter into the equation.
None of this is on the point, though. I still see no scenario in which any team is motivated to leave their 28th best (or 28th most useful) player exposed.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Simply because utility for different teams
Isn’t the same.
Furthermore there are 40-man roster spots taken up by guys who are questionably on the 40-man roster.
If this weren’t true, wouldn’t there never be a Rule V selection?
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
There is some variation in utility.
There is also some imbalance between teams. That is indeed why there are some Rule 5 selections.
I’m saying it’s a big gap to cover, due to the 15-man discrepancy between the roster cutoff that makes a guy eligible and the roster cutoff that lets you keep a guy. Because it’s a big gap, there are only occasional opportunities — not a vast untapped opportunity that teams have inexplicably failed to take advantage of.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
And also
Re: Choice. I know why he isn’t on the 40-man or eligible for the Rule V. But it was just a point that 40-man roster doesn’t equal 40-best players.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
OK.
When I said 40 best, I meant 40 best within the eligibility universe.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Goleski is a special case.
What the A’s failed to see in Ryan Goleski was that he was injured. A month before the draft he underwent surgery to have bone chips removed from his wrist and the A’s didn’t know about it. (Story.)
Exactly whose fault that is is not clear. The surgery was not kept secret, and if the A’s had investigated that would have known about it. On the other hand, teams are required to file an injury report list and Goleski was not on it.
The A’s and Indians worked out a settlement privately, and we don’t know what compensation, if any, the Indians provided. When a Rule 5 player is returned, it is for $25,000 (half the original price for claiming him); it’s possible the A’s asked Cleveland to reimburse additional funds with the return.
Anyway, my point is that with Goleski it is clear and identifiable what was overlooked. Without the injury, he might have turned out completely different.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Also, WRT Hamilton
the issue, I think, was his history of drug use and whether his career was already over before it had started. I can definitely imagine teams saying, “Look, the dude is basically Steve Howe with a bat, we don’t want any part of him.”
"And Julio Franco is batting right-handed!" -- Wayne Hagin, A's radio play-by-play, mid-80s
There's hookers in Davenport Iowa?
Hey, that’s only 40 miles away !!!
They service the entire Quad Cities area
"And Julio Franco is batting right-handed!" -- Wayne Hagin, A's radio play-by-play, mid-80s
Actually, there is a (limited) way to find out which scouts did what
If you’re really gung-ho on this subject shoot me an e-mail and maybe we can figure out a way to attack the research.
Address is in the profile.
The monster at the end of this blog.
I'd love to....
..but I don’t have the time to do the kind of research you’re suggesting. I comment and read on here, as do many, on breaks.
I think, though, that this would come closer to answering what dwishinsky takes for granted, i.e. is it as random as he says, or are there people who have come closer to removing at least a portion of the randomness.
a few questions
that came to me from reading your post.
1. Do you see organizational differences in terms of how “top heavy” the drafts turn out? I think that a lot of people have knocked the A’s for taking the safe picks, which I interpret to mean players that have a low ceiling but high likelihood to make the Majors. I guess you would really need to control for draft slot here, because obviously the ARods and so on are mostly taken with the first five picks.
2. If there are teams that aim for stars, I assume these teams would also have a much bigger standard deviation between draft classes. Maybe this is obviously true, but it would be nice to check (pending the results of question 1).
Its pretty tedious extrapolating all the data as you can imagine...
But to answer 1) I think picking earlier likely does help your odds. But, I don’t know that there is such a thing as a “safe pick”. I don’t think the A’s have gone into the first round looking for low-ceiling likely MLBers. One thing one could argue taints the process is signability. That means that the order selected isnt a true reflection of talent. So I don’t think that that is necessarily true in #2, since I looked at the entire draft class, and virtually all teams had a significant standard deviation. In fact interestingly the A’s, I believe have the widest difference between Average WAR and standard deviation. A lot of teams have a standard deviation wider than their average WAR.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
signability has definitely played a part
The A’s regularly pass on guys who are signable but are going to cost a lot of money. But all teams do. But I disagree with the part about low-ceiling MLBers – I think the A’s made a conscious choice a few years back (and I think I remember reading this somewhere) that they were going to look for guys who would definitely make the majors, even if their ceiling was low, because they didn’t want to risk big signing bonuses on guys who might never make the big club. So instead of going for a young toolsy high school kid who might turn into a star they’ve gone for the lower ceiling but more sure-thing college guy. If you look at their first round picks since the early 2000s they’re riddled with these kinds of picks.
by jdr on Jan 8, 2012 7:28 PM PST up reply actions
That makes more sense....
…and, in the end, what it means is that the organization made the choice to cheap out on draft choices.
I think that’s changed over the past three or four years, with the signing of Ynoa and afterwards, and we’ll have to see if there are results.
Max Stassi, in spite of turning out poorly so far,
is an example of the A’s recent willingness to pay extra to sign a guy who fell in the draft due to signability concerns.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Disagree With the Third Paragraph
You’d be hard-pressed to make a strong case that the A’s – despite their financial situation- are able to compete with teams like Boston and New York, and are on an even level with powerhouses such as those two franchises.
What he says in the second paragraph is completely right, though, and in a way contradicts what he says in the third paragraph. With a low revenue, it’s hard to sign premier free agents or to keep good, homegrown players for longer then the time that they’re under club control. As a result, small-market teams have a tougher time putting together very good teams that are able to contend, unless they strike gold in the draft and pull off some sweet trades. This was maybe the primary way the A’s won in the early-mid 2000’s: if you take a look at the core for most of those years, you come up with guys who were basically developed by the A’s: Hudson, Zito, Mulder, Chavez, Tejada. The best example of what Keri says in his second paragraph was Jason Giambi. A fantastic player, Giambi left the A’s for the Yankees because of the large amount of money New York was offering him.
This actually is an example of the kind of effect free agency has on a team’s success, because it would almost eliminate the idea of a small-market team in the context of putting together a squad. As a result, players would be getting paid peanuts and all teams would have to rely on the draft and trades to put together a strong squad, which is now really the only option for small-market teams like Oakland. If this was the case, we wouldn’t get things like the Angels paying Albert Pujols over 250 million dollars over ten years.
Baseball is a game where money has a large impact, and free agency is really a big part of that: big-name players leave their teams, look for the most money they can get, and head over to that franchise. Super-rich teams will usually get dibs in this because they have so much more to spend than the others. This can, however result in some big mistakes – take A-Rod’s monster contract, the one he signed in 2007, I believe; is what Alex Rodriguez is doing now performance-wise worth over 20 million a year? I know it’s partly for publicity (fans, homerun record), but I never thought it was a good idea. Albert’s signing is more plausible, because he’s younger then A-Rod was and is a phenomenal player, but even so, I wonder what’ll happen in those last few years, and whether it might just be a couple of million burning a hole in the Angels pocket because Albert has fallen drastically from the level he is currently at.
And yes, as mentioned at the end, the draft is based a lot on luck, because no matter how well a player has performed in college or high school ball, and no matter what kind of stats he put up, you cannot totally predict how he will play in the majors and how he’ll fare as a big leaguer at a level unlike anything else.
It is weird
Because I think we agree that Keri clearly gets the issue. That is why I found it weird that he went in such a different direction in his criticism. I would love to know how the Rays won’t fall victim to something like this potentially. Yesterday, I did a podcast with Sam Miller of the OC Register who covers the Angels and he did say one thing that was interesting which was “the A’s try to be perfect” (paraphrasing) and wait for not only their window of success but want it to align with everyone else being terrible. Clearly the Rays haven’t done that, and I wonder what the impact of that is on how the A’s create a team. I need to digest it a bit, look more into the stats, numbers, standings but I think he is definitely onto something there.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Don't have time to formulate much on this comment
but this is a HELL of a post…
"Oh who am I kidding? The A's and Giants could stage a pillow fight, and I'd still care who wins." -67Marquez
Nice attempt at quantifying the draft!
As it often is in life, I think skill in the MLB draft falls in the hazy middle on the spectrum from total crapshoot to exact science.
First, it’s important to realize evaluating human performance is a tricky business. People are complex and unpredictable. Corporations hire new workers all the time and sometimes they are horrible employees. No matter how much data one gathers on a person, there will always be an element of the unknown.
On the flip side, there are statistical tools that help us evaluate trends. First, there are extreme outliers. It’s very doubtful a 5’ 01’’ pitcher will blow pro hitters away with his fastball. There are some obvious rules of thumb, such as speedier guys tending to be better base stealers. Other trends are less obvious. How is intelligence a factor? Is GPA in indicator of baseball IQ and how much does baseball IQ help a prospect develop into a player?
When you evaluate talent, what you are really evaluating is a team’s ability to pick the correct trends that most likely predict desired outcomes. For a long while Oakland focused on college-level pitching, clearly believing that such players developed into better ballplayers. I imagine a statistical guru with access to as much prospect data as possible could potentially pick out these trends. Step two would be seeing which trends seem to truly translate into MLB success.
Another problem with draft analysis is that other factors affect draft choices beyond pure talent evaluation. There’s the problem of position in draft for first round draft picks. There are monetary concerns. While everyone always preaches taking the best talent, it’s probable that some amount of positional targeting occurs. Much of this is data the public will never see, so we can’t ascertain the degree to which it effects drafting.
Even if you can choices based solely on talent, a whole other factor impedes the ability to see how the choice panned out. Development. Tied into this whole process is the prospect’s journey through the minor leagues. There is always a what-if game. Would Pujols have developed the same had he not come up through the Cardinal’s system. Was there a coach that gave the prospect a new approach to hitting. Did a pitcher learn a new pitch? Was conditioning a factor. This all needs accounting for if you want to isolate a club’s ability to predict trends that lead to player success.
Finally, and this a key, the public will never be able to analyze front office draft decisions. Why? Sample size. We see one or two first round picks a year, 40 or so picks total. Beane has picked about a dozen first rounders. Twelve is just not enough to get a sense of Beane’s ability to select first round talent.
What we really need is to look at the Oakland A’s entire draft board every year. Just because they didn’t pick a guy didn’t mean they hadn’t considered the guy. Were the A’s putting guys like Ryan Braun and Felix Henandez toward the top of their draft boards or were they bearish? That’s the data set we need. All clubs surely play this game. They have a system, if they’re smart they look at how the system they historically employed evaluated the future and adjust accordingly.
Keep in mind that the wave of sabermetric analysis has not been around very long. 10 years isn’t a ton of data. So place the talent evaluation point where you will on the spectrum of science and luck. And know that you’ll never find out how right or wrong you were.
Ciderbeck
You make a good point that we do have any information on who the other options were. For example did they select Player X, when they wanted Players Y, Z and A selected before him. But I think in the end it has to shake out over the course of a 60 or so round draft that you aren’t stuck with 45 guys you had absolutely no interest in.
To figure out if people are good at finding first round draft choices, yeah you are fair there. But my guess (and it is a guess) is that the draft board of a lot of teams are quite similar. I don’t think Oakland sees someone as first round talent that the Blue Jays see as eighth round talent and vice versa, I assume there is a level of consensus (at least we see that also when looking at draft previews, scouting handbooks, etc)
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Yeah, I admit that most teams would likely have similar-looking boards
But that’s exactly why it’d be so great to look at the data. I noted earlier in other post on this thread that the theoretical perfection of scouting will be reached when the best pro player gets selected first in the draft, the second-best selected second, and so on.
Now one argument is that it is simply impossible to eliminate some amount of luck. For that you have to look at the luck vs. science spectrum I talked about above. But that’s getting away from my point.
Assume you somehow factor in luck, there still must exist some theoretically best draft board to generate using the future data of how players turned out. The question becomes which teams have come the closest to matching said perfection. I would guess that sabermetrics have helped every team get closer to that goal, with draft day boards from team to team mimicking each other more and more.
So what’s the deviation from team to team? There’s the real question. And how much of that deviation is caused by team prospect forecasting skill, dumb luck (right choice for the wrong reason), or universal luck (the crapshoot principle, a good choice turned great by a roll of dice)?
by Ciderbeck on Jan 9, 2012 1:33 PM PST up reply actions 1 recs
That is an interesting way of looking at it.
Rec’d
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Your vision of theoretical perfection
assumes that there really is such thing as a best player, and that the best player for one team is the same as the best player for every other team.
To me, that assumption is neither self-evident nor demonstrated.
(It may, however, be such an ontological abstraction that its truth or falsity is irrelevant….)
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
I think I just wandered into a philosophical minefield
Seems to me a guy like say Albert Pujols would be defined as a great player no matter what metric is chosen. Are you saying it’s impossible to define a best player? Maybe different teams have different needs, but at least for each individual team wouldn’t there be a ranking of who would be best for them?
I'm suggesting that perhaps the best player
doesn’t become the best player until it actually happens. It might not be meaningful to discuss a best player — even an unidentified one — as being the best before his wave function collapses, so to speak. And if the way he resolves is in fact a function of the draft choice — the equivalent of an observer effect, say — then it’s even more problematic.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Want to highlight this great post
I didn’t see it when I posted this but it tackles a similar subject and comes to a similar conclusion as mine while looking at the draft by rounds as opposed to by draft classes.
Great work: CLICK HERE
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Really enjoyed this piece...
…as well as the ensuing discussion. Great stuff.
A few quick points:
—I do, in fact, believe that is more difficult for a smaller-revenue team to sustain success than it is for a larger-revenue team, all else being equal:
“There is a nugget of truth behind this Window obsession. Smaller-revenue teams have a tougher time signing premium free agents, or retaining their own top players past their initial six years of team control. That puts extra pressure on these poorer teams to bring up a bunch of great prospects all at once, then hope they get good at the same time before they get expensive.”
(I didn’t write the headline)
—The section on the Rays was specifically written to rebut Beane’s claim about how impossible it is to “be strong for three, four, five winning seasons in a row.” The Rays are at 4. The Twins had a significantly longer streak until recently. It is difficult. But it’s clearly not impossible.
—The line that really got me was Beane’s bit about not being able to contend without a new stadium. That to me is the crux of this, the excuse-making and lobbying on behalf of the org. A new stadium will almost certainly help. But the A’s were very, very good for 8 years in a row, and it’s not like that’s ancient history. In half a decade we go from sustained excellence to absolutely impossible to win without a new ballpark?
-The discussion in the post and the thread about how difficult it is to find the right players - in the draft, when trading for prospects, etc — is excellent. The A’s do have the disadvantage of lacking the high picks that the Rays (and the Pirates and Royals, two more teams who’ve picked high forever but are still trying to get back above .500) have had. Still, it’s been a long time since the A’s have developed a serious hitter. Cast the blame wherever you like, but it’s certainly cost them.
Anyway, thanks for deeming my doodles worthy of discussion. Really appreciate the feedback, both positive and negative.
by Jonah Keri on Jan 9, 2012 10:26 AM PST reply actions 5 recs
Thanks for participaing Jonah
I do think if you look comparatively between the haves and the have nots in baseball and that gap has widened. How many more teams are over $100 million in spending as to when the A’s were more competitive with the big spenders? There were 12 in 2011 and likely more in 2012 with the Rangers I’m betting being added to that list. Yes the Rays are an exception but for every team like the Rays and Twins (who have a new ballpark now), you have the Pirates, Royals, Mariners, Orioles, Blue Jays and others. Yes many of those teams have new (or renovated) stadiums but Beane has lost the ability to attract any free agents other than the clearly damaged but trying to rebuild value free agents or on the other side of a great career and about to call it quits. Beane clearly wanted Beltre badly. He lost out. Furcal. He lost out.
I just think it’s really hard to assemble a team without having that adequate funding that a new stadium brings. You’ll never get any free agents of much value and you’re truly dependent on being more successful than bigger markets in the drafting and development. The A’s clearly haven’t been able to do that which is a problem. But they have a much smaller margin of error when it comes to building a successful team.
by Tyler Bleszinski on Jan 9, 2012 11:03 AM PST up reply actions
One minor point about Furcal
Sometimes it’s helpful not to make mistakes you can’t afford. Furcal signed his FA contract with the Dodgers in December of 2008. Since then…
Furcal 2009-11: bWAR 7.4 Salary: $30,000,000
Pennington 2009-11: bWAR 5.7 Salary: $1,250,000
numbers from baseball-reference.com; b-r doesn’t have Pennington’s salary data for 2009 for some reason, so I’m guessing it was about $425K, which is probably an overestimation
That adds up to $28,875,000 for less than two extra wins over 3 years.
"And Julio Franco is batting right-handed!" -- Wayne Hagin, A's radio play-by-play, mid-80s
by Nick on Jan 9, 2012 11:18 AM PST up reply actions 1 recs
Oh I agree
This is that you have much more leeway to make those mistakes if you have a bigger budget from a newer stadium. Maybe it helps save them from those kinds of mistakes but it at least makes them better players.
by Tyler Bleszinski on Jan 9, 2012 3:25 PM PST up reply actions
I think there is a degree of truth to the stadium excuse
Though I also think it is a savvy move to sort of get the ultimate goal of getting a new stadium which clearly given teh slow movement of the Selig committee, needs some prodding. Though it does risk alienating a large part of the fanbase (which we can argue we have seen).
What do you feel is necessary for a low-revenue/small-market team to contend? To me the draft is sort of a necessary part of that but also is a near impossible way to do it as well that leaves you at the whim of luck. What recipe do you think exists to counteract that?
Also, I’d be curious: the headline obviously colors the way the piece is received (perhaps at least by A’s fans). Had you had the choice, how would you have titled it?
(THANK YOU ALSO!!!)
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
I stink with headlines
You can contend in a million different ways – draft well, dumpster-dive well, keep your players healthy, don’t overextend on long-term deals, exploit market inefficiencies (OBP, defense, whatever)…no shortage of ways, no one way is “right.”
Good headline writers write something that’s provocative, which elicits exactly this kind of response — heated, but at least people read the darn thing. As a too-honest Canadian, my headline would probably be: “Oakland A’s: Gosh, they were really good. Now they’re not as good. Posturing for a new stadium is smart. But could you please not use it as an excuse? It’s a little disingenuous.”
Not very catchy.
by Jonah Keri on Jan 9, 2012 11:47 AM PST up reply actions 1 recs
You'd be scraping around for toonies in your chesterfield cushions with a headline like that ;)
Do you think a team can consistently “draft well”? I agree with the dumpster-dive well – I think that teams should look for people with problems they feel they can remedy. Absolutely agree with the careful with extensions and health considerations too.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Thanks for taking the time to respond here Mr. Keri
As you can tell, it certainly riled up A’s fans, myself included.
I appreciate you for posting a response on AN. It has helped changed my mind on your Grantland piece. In the article, you came down quite harshly on the A’s team-building strategy of the last few years. But I believe the real point you wanted to get across was that Beane should not blame the team’s failure on competitive windows, and most especially not on lack of a new stadium. Is that a fair assessment?
I have a couple of critiques. First, you yourself acknowledge that there is a cycle of winning and losing. High draft picks generate better talent, which very much helped both the A’s (Mulder, Zito, Chavez) and more recently the Rays (Upton, Longoria, Price) build successful teams. Without top-10 picks, the A’s of late have been struggling to generate hitting talent. In part because of your piece Mr. Keri we’ve spent the past week on this blog discussing various aspects of the draft, including the affect of draft slot on talent level. One clear result is that it’s much harder to find top talent outside the top 15 picks. I’ll add that recent A’s first round picks have so far been looking great (Weeks, Choice, Green). No flameouts yet, though time will time. So maybe saying Beane “fucked up” the last five years is overstating the facts?
Second, if you want to call out Beane and Wolff for using the recent run of losing A’s seasons as leverage for a new stadium then do so. I personally don’t blame the A’s front office for using this tactic. The A’s want a new park and if crying poor is a way to clear the territorial rights roadblock then so be it. Selig hasn’t exactly been supportive so why should Oakland play nice?
I think the piece would have come off much better if you had shown more proof that old stadiums don’t affect on field talent and then accused the A’s front office of blatant PR spin. I would greatly enjoy reading more about the financial aspect of baseball as it’s something I don’t much about. You stated at the end of the Grantland article that stadium revenue and on-field team production aren’t at all related. I’m don’t fully believe this assessment, but that’s just a common sense response as I know very little about the subject. Instead of educating myself and others on the main issue you chose to instead accuse Beane of being a terrible GM, which was off-base and muddled the main thesis of your article. That’s why I disliked this particular Grantland post.
Not quite
Didn’t say stadium revenue and on-field performance aren’t at all related. I said that Beane’s contention that the A’s can’t possibly compete without a new stadium is false. There are several counterexamples to his claim, not the least of which are the A’s themselves 1999-2006.
Otherwise, you have the intention of the piece down cold, yes.
And again, I do believe that windows exist. I wrote as much in the article. Heck, the first significant baseball article I ever wrote was called, not-subtly, The Success Cycle:
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=1357
Fun trip back in time with that article
Boy that ’02 Toronto team of Hinske and Prokopec was something, huh? Thanks for the link.
I think it’s quite awesome that you took some time to stop by AN’s neck of the woods and respond to some of our concerns. I concur that Beane’s clearly wrong about it being impossible to compete with the stadium we have. As you say, there’s plenty of evidence to the contrary. Still makes thing harder, though. I’m not convinced it’s entirely true, but it was widely reported that Adrian Beltre didn’t want to come to Oakland this past year in part because of the stadium. That stung as a fan. Would love to see the 2011 AL West replayed with Beltre in Oakland rather than Texas.
And I’ll state again that whatever PR spin the front office feels compelled to toss out there to get us past the territorial rights problem, well, I just can’t begrudge them for it. Even if it motivates quality bloggers such as yourself to call Beane out on his spurious claims.
Don't have much to say, other than your article was a good read even though I disagreed with some of it
But I want to mention how awesome it is that you came here and joined the discussion. Very, very cool and I look forward to reading more of your stuff in the future!
by stranahanahan on Jan 10, 2012 11:19 PM PST up reply actions
If I make millions with a lemonade-stand franchise
and then I purchase a lawn-mowing business, I should invest lots of my lemonade-stand money into the lawn-mowing business, in order to make it successful. I shouldn’t expect my lawn-mowing company to stand on it’s own, necessarily. Crying poverty and “bad lawn-mowing oppportunities” while my lemonade stand business flourishes makes little sense to me. Why even buy the yard maint. company to begin with?
You see my point – the A’s have ownership with deep pockets who refuse to spend money made in other business ventures on the baseball club.
Is it their right to spend their money (or not spend it) on whatever they like? Sure it is. But you’ll get no sympathy from me when you start crying about the stadium, salaries, etc. If you weren’t a fan, and weren’t prepared to dip into other resource pools to help the baseball team, you shouldn’t have invested in the team, in my opinion.
I needed a team so I wouldn’t turn into one of the eighty million pink hat-wearing Bud Light-drinking mulleted idiots at Fenway.
What if no one (relative to other lawn-moving services) wants to use your service
And, when you look into mowing lawns in other neighborhoods, the lawn mowers’ association (who you bought your lawn-mowing license from) opposes your move because your grandfather (the lawn-mowing business’ prior owner) gave out your right to move to a new neighborhood for free?
All businesses must be able to stand on their own; else, it’s not a business anymore.
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 9, 2012 11:30 AM PST up reply actions 1 recs
There is such a thing as "due diligence"
and you as a prospective business buyer are obligated to do it. To buy a lawn-mowing business without determining the demographics and state of competition, to to mention to actual numbers of the lawn-mowing business you are about to buy would be incredibly foolish. And most lemonade millionaires are not all that foolish.
So why would the lemonade guy find himself on the outs? Well, his due diligence might have suggested a market trend in lawn-mowing that never came to pass. Maybe there was a sustained drought and lawn-mowing as a whole is suffering.Maybe non-contractual promises were made that he bet on … ooops. Maybe a lawn-mowing manager is hired who has a history of being around a winning lawn-mower company, but isn’t really up to the task of running a lawn-mowing company as top-dog.
But at the end of the day, its ALL still on the lemonade millionaire. Not the lemonade customers, not the lawn-mowing clientele, not the competition, not another city’s grass customers. So the lemonade millionaire cannot legitimately claim it IS their fault; it is up to him to either run the lawn-mowing company at a loss, hire sufficient good help that even better help is attracted, ensure the old equipment is really well-taken-care-of, etc.
Or he can just take the lawn-mowing association’s profit-share and pocket it, all while complaining about all the above, and publicly ticking off his few remaining lawn-mowing clients by griping that they don’t mow their grass enough, and they don’t really even deserve a good lawn-mowing company, and by golly as soon as some other town allows it, he’s otta here.
I think it's pretty clear that Wolff/Fisher did research
the situation before buying the team; they did have an idea of how hard it would be to move the team; and unfortunately for them it has turned out worse than they expected.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
The problem in a nutshell then
is they bought the team, planning to move from Day 1. I suppose if it “only” takes them 10-13 years to move the team, they’ll say it was almost like overnight. I do agree with you though; for whatever reason they thought moving the team wasn’t going to be that big a deal.
Of course they planned on change from day one.
Wolff was hired as a consultant to figure out the viability of building in Oakland, or elsewhere in the Bay Area. The reason he bought the team, is that he and his co-owners were willing to invest in the move, while Schott & Co weren’t. People invest in companies to increase profits. I have no issue with the A’s doing what it takes to make money. Oakland screwed with the A’s. The Coliseum was not designed for efficient remodeling. If it were, the A’s would probably stay.
"Trying not to rec a "F**k the Giants" post is like trying not to look at boobs."-anonymous
"i guess i just like beer"-stm
yeah - they did their research
and that research led them right to the South Bay, which is exactly where they wanted to head from the moment they bought the team; else they wouldn’t have proposed such preposterous new venue ideas to the City of Oakland; else they wouldn’t have balked at picking up an additional $250,000 in the cost of a feasibility study that they tried unsuccessfully to have Oakland pay for.
by oakballnack on Jan 10, 2012 11:29 AM PST up reply actions
In most businesses, you can choose your destiny to a better extent than in baseball
If you don’t like where you are doing business, you can move (albeit at significant expense). If your employees suck, you can replace them with employees who are demonstrably better for roughly the same cost. Neither of those things can happen in baseball.
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 10, 2012 9:33 AM PST up reply actions
I get that but...
I think you treat them like individual businesses. There is no public requirement to invest in a team from external sources. We all would love it, but it is fair that they want to run it as a profitable stand alone business.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Yeah, I wouldn't try to argue that they don't have the right to spend - or keep - their money.
I just think that if “turning a profit” is the only reason why you’re purchasing or investing in a business, why the hell would you buy a baseball team? Sure seems like there’d be better investment opportunities out there.
Makes me believe that owning a baseball franchise is a lot more profitable than the owners let on …. is Fisher that stupid? Why would he invest in the A’s just so he could break even at best or lose money??
One of two things has to be true. 1 – Wolff/Fisher made a very poor business decision. This seems unlikely to me – hard to think they didn’t know exactly what they were getting when they purchased the franchise. “Hey, John Fisher, you want to invest in the A’s and barely break even and/or never turn a profit?” Surrrrrrre!!!
2. It wasn’t that bad a business decision – they know they will make money (immediately or in the future) on the deal, and they simply refuse to invest money made in other business ventures to help the sell the product.
Again, I completely agree this is their right … but it doesn’t help the fanbase or the team in any way, shape or form. And I won’t – not for a second – feel sympathy for a failing business owner who doesn’t do everything in his or her power to turn the business around. Like I said above, if I’m not prepared to throw some lemonade money at the lawn-mowing business to help make it one of the best, I never should’ve bought the lawncare company to begin with. Makes no sense, whatsoever.
I needed a team so I wouldn’t turn into one of the eighty million pink hat-wearing Bud Light-drinking mulleted idiots at Fenway.
You mentioned something interesting....
“And I won’t – not for a second – feel sympathy for a failing business owner who doesn’t do everything in his or her power to turn the business around.”
What would turn the business around? Moving to a more profitable city? Seems like they are doing everything in their power to turn the state of the business around. Don’t agree with the tactics they are using, fine, but it seems like the health of the business is exactly what the ownership cares about. They are taking one step back to take two steps forward. They are making controversial decisions and risking their fanbase because they believe the product they produce in the future will make up for it.
It’s a gamble, but it could be a good gamble if the future product delivers.
They are letting their lemonade stand do it’s thing on it’s own and are taking their lumps with the lawn mowing business. It’ll be a rough patch, but they are banking on the idea that someday their lawn mowing business will be just as powerful as their lemonade stand. Then, instead of having one great business supporting one not so great, they will have two great businesses running completely independently. If your lawn mowing business is kept afloat by your lemonade stand all you have is the illusion of that second business. What happens if a report comes out that lemonade causes cancer and your stand goes under. Not only will your lemonade stand go under, but so will your lawn mowing business. If you took the time, took your lumps and developed your lawn mowing business into something that didn’t require a welfare check from lemonade then at least you’d have that once the lemonade stand went under.
by Maverick10126 on Jan 9, 2012 12:47 PM PST up reply actions
It's really hard to speak to motivation of the owners
From the bits and pieces I’ve read I only offer a couple tidbits:
1) John Fischer is reportedly a big fan of Bay Area baseball. He was part of the team of investors that kept the Giants in the Bay when they were thinking of moving in the 1990s.
2) Lew Wolff has many ties to San Jose. He helped revitalize downtown. And he helped bring an MLS franchise back to San Jose.
Everything else I got is speculation. Would be neat if we all put together a list of cold-hard facts on ownership at some point.
It seems clear, though we can never truly say for sure, that the main motivation for Fischer and Wolff is to move the team to San Jose. That seems to trump building a winning franchise, since the two don’t throw tons of money at payroll. Is the motivation for a SJ move fandom/personal or business or maybe an attempt to gloriously merge the two? Who knows? Anyway, be interesting to hear others’ take on the subject.
Both is the ideal, right?
Owners don’t really want a winner (at least, not for that long) that bleeds money, nor do they necessarily want a loser that makes money (because both are unsustainable).
Unfortunately, baseball doesn’t follow all the same fundamental rules as other businesses do. It can never “fail” inasmuch as owners have always turned a profit on their initial investment.
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 9, 2012 2:00 PM PST up reply actions
Seems like there's a very easy answer
to the John Fisher question: He does like baseball and does enjoy owning a team. Because of that he is willing to make less money on his A’s investment than if he put the same money in a different investment. However, he doesn’t like it so much that he’s willing to lose a huge amount of money, so while he accepts the modestly lower return of owning a ball team, he doesn’t want to become the sort of ball team that overspends.
Like the rest of you, I don’t know Fisher so I don’t actually know this is the case. But it’s a simple and obvious explanation that meets all the known facts, so why are we acting like Fisher’s motives are some sort of mysterious paradox?
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
That's a darn good summation of the financial aspects of owning a club
It still doesn’t address ownership thoughts on moving the team, which is more what I’m worried about.
Going back to payroll issues; if Fischer, as you say, doesn’t want overspend, and that prevents the fielding of a non-competitive team then that’s pretty frustrating as a fan. At some point I really should read up more on the business of baseball to understand how Oakland’s finances work. It would be good to know, for example, how profitable the team is and how much of the profit could be sacrificed to payroll. $5 million? $20 million?
It would be fun to have an owner hell-bent on winning, damn the cost. Well, within r, let’s not saddle the team with horrible contracts. But more money for more smart contracts would be nice.
Good luck with that.
The reading up part, I mean. Baseball teams are privately owned with little or no motive to share information on how their finances work. The Forbes series is generally viewed as the most accurate analysis, and it really doesn’t tell you much. A few teams’ financial papers were leaked last year, but even those were devised for a specific target audience (the MLB front office, I assume) and thus probably don’t tell the whole story either.
I do recommend Maury Brown’s Biz of Baseball blog, though, if you want a better facility with the financial side of major-league baseball.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Another thing to keep in mind.
We A’s fans have exaggerated the current losing record. We imagine ourselves irretrievably sunk in a pit of perpetual suck. In fact, we’re having a bad spell, but compared to many teams it’s still not that bad.
The reality is that is mathematically impossible for all of the team to be “competitive” all the time. It is the nature of scoring the game that leaguewide there will be as many total losses as total wins, which in turn means that roughly half the teams are going to have losing seasons.
If the A’s spending a little more makes them winners, then why don’t all the other loser teams — the Pirates, the Orioles, the Royals, the Astros, etc — do the same thing? And if they do, and if it works for all of us, then which teams will lose instead? Ultimately all you do is jack up the payroll all around and still somebody loses.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
I have been able to see the finances of some teams in other sports
And I can tell you that most teams are not as profitable as you think. Even if there is a profit on paper, that cash gets reinvested in the organization. Owners are constantly asked to inject capital.
The only way to really make money on the average sports team is through appreciation in the value of the franchise… and that has worked well for many. It may even be working for Fisher. But from a cash flow perspective, I am almost positive that the A’s are a terrible investment no matter the payroll.
And if you think about valuation… what would bring more value to his investment than a move to San Jose? Not much…
I don’t see any villians in any of this except the Giants. I hate those guys.
But we keep hearing about the A's being a small-market club.
It’s demonstrably not true: http://www.baseball-almanac.com/articles/baseball_markets.shtml
Granted, San Fransisco is “prettier” but … but … but ….
Definitely low-revenue
but whose fault is that? If you accept the premise that the A’s are playing in the 5th-largest market in MLB, bigger than the Red Sox and the Phillies, just to name two that spend money on the roster like there’s no tomorrow, then maybe Lew and John should be slapped on the fingers.
Yes, it looks like they’ll get the move to San Jose. But will they spend RSN money on the roster then, or will they keep crying “alms for the poor?”
The Sox and the Phillies have those markets all to themselves, though
"And Julio Franco is batting right-handed!" -- Wayne Hagin, A's radio play-by-play, mid-80s
True, but
the four markets immediately above the A’s/Giants are also shared markets. Most of those other 8 teams are pretty free-spending.
I think we have to set aside NY and LA
The NY market has 21 million people in it, and LA has 16 million. The Bay Area has just over 7 million. They’re not really comparable.
Chicago is also a good deal bigger (about 25% larger than the Bay Area). The really comparable one is Baltimore/DC, and even if they’re considered a single media market, those cities are 45 miles apart. It’s not the same as what the A’s are facing.
"And Julio Franco is batting right-handed!" -- Wayne Hagin, A's radio play-by-play, mid-80s
Exactly.
It isn’t like people are driving from north of Baltimore to Nats games regularly or vice-versa from NoVa to Camden to see the O’s.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
I'd also add there is a difference in our market of stadiums
You can see the game at a jewel like AT&T Park or comparable dump (yes it is our dump! :D ) in Oakland. For a casual fan, that isn’t a tough choice.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Good points.
I needed a team so I wouldn’t turn into one of the eighty million pink hat-wearing Bud Light-drinking mulleted idiots at Fenway.
No owner of a professional sports team
wants it only for profit. If profit is the only consideration, there is always a better investment somewhere. But profit is not the only consideration. Even billionaires would rather own something that think is cool and fun.
The sort of billionaire who buys a ball team is willing to accept a lower return on the investment — possibly much lower, or even negative — in exchange for the satisfaction of owning a baseball team. How much he is willing to lose varies by owner, some care more and some care less. None is so extreme that he’s in it only for the money. Also, none is so extreme that he cares only for winning no matter what the cost. Even if an owner did feel that way, there would be a limit where he simply couldn’t afford it.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Most of the top spending clubs also have unreal local TV deals that help them.
I don’t think the slegnA would have spent what they did to sign Pujols and Wilson, if the new TV deal isn’t what it is
"Trying not to rec a "F**k the Giants" post is like trying not to look at boobs."-anonymous
"i guess i just like beer"-stm
this is why the A's are screwed. they lack both stadium and the ability for a regional sports network
the artist formerly known as inbillywetrust
The TV deal is what must make us analyze the A's differently from other teams.
We just can’t condemn the ownership for lack of investment, when wealthier teams don’t have to dip into their personal coffers.
"Trying not to rec a "F**k the Giants" post is like trying not to look at boobs."-anonymous
"i guess i just like beer"-stm
i'm not arguing that ownership is cheap or should spend all their non-A's dollars too. i'm just saying that our team's competitive positioning has gotten dramatically worse recently. my mariners friends tell me that there's one coming their way soon too
the artist formerly known as inbillywetrust
Oh, I know you aren't saying this, stm. ☺
I was just commenting on those who think that Wolff and Co don’t spend their own money to buy a winning team. There really is a whole lot more to the A’s revenue situation than the Coliseum itself. The slegnA TV contract is worth way more than our team owners worth.
"Trying not to rec a "F**k the Giants" post is like trying not to look at boobs."-anonymous
"i guess i just like beer"-stm
Of course Wolff and Fisher "spend their own money"
The question is, do Wolff and Fisher take resources from other successful business ventures and spend it on the A’s?
Once again, the question isn’t one of “is it the owners right to spend or keep their money how they see fit?” It most certainly is.
But I’m not going to have a lot of sympathy when they tell me how difficult it is to put a winner on the field, how broke they’re going because nobody comes to the Coliseum, etc. etc. if they’re only trying to make do with what they earn with the A’s.
Why can’t I “condemn the ownership for lack of investment when wealthier teams don’t have to dip into their personal coffers”? What do wealthier teams have to do with the A’s?! Tough s***. They knew what they were getting when they purchased the A’s – they knew it wasn’t the Yankees or Angels. I’m supposed to say “Well, the Yankees owners don’t have to invest from other businesses in order to succeed, so I shouldn’t expect the A’s ownership to do it, either.” Um, no.
All I’m saying is, why buy the A’s to begin with if you’re not going to do all you can – all you can – all you can – in order to make it successful?
I needed a team so I wouldn’t turn into one of the eighty million pink hat-wearing Bud Light-drinking mulleted idiots at Fenway.
Ok, then HOW MUCH is enough to satisfy you?
Should they spend all their money? 1/2? 1/10th? How do you want them to invest this money? In the draft? In FAs? Aren’t these just quick fixes that can’t last? Or, in a new stadium that will increase their revenue in order to make them a viable franchise for years to come. They ARE willing to invest $400M+ in the new stadium. Isn’t this using “their own money?” I see this as a wiser investment than gambling year by year buying your team.
"Trying not to rec a "F**k the Giants" post is like trying not to look at boobs."-anonymous
"i guess i just like beer"-stm
Good question. I have no idea.
Those are great points, they really are. And I also agree that moving the ballclub to San Jose and building a stadium there shows a committment to investment towards making the team better.
I’ve got a buddy who has an old Mustang in his garage … thing just sits there. Good shape – he could get a nice chunk of change for it. He’s always complaining to me how he’s got no money. Scraping every month to pay PGE, rent, etc. Now what he does or doesn’t do with the car is his business – he could be saving it for his kids college – I don’t know. But don’t whine and cry about being broke, that’s all I ask. Don’t expect me to sympathize with your plight when there’s some help sitting in your garage.
I needed a team so I wouldn’t turn into one of the eighty million pink hat-wearing Bud Light-drinking mulleted idiots at Fenway.
The problem with your analogy, as I see it...
is that your friend is free to sell the car, or do whatever is possible to pay his bills. The A’s aren’t. They can’t just up and move to San Jose, even though it will improve their competitiveness. They have to plead their case, AND get approval from the other owners,( one of which DOESN’T want them to even exist). They feel that this is the only way they can get their point across to get the approval. I don’t agree that the A’s ownership should sell their other investments to pay for the A’s. Fisher shouldn’t have to sell The Gap to get FAs to sign here.
"Trying not to rec a "F**k the Giants" post is like trying not to look at boobs."-anonymous
"i guess i just like beer"-stm
Oh, and the A's can pay their own bills. They don't even need the luxury tax to do so.
All they have to do is sign nothing but league minimum players. Of course, then people will complain that they aren’t competitive…
"Trying not to rec a "F**k the Giants" post is like trying not to look at boobs."-anonymous
"i guess i just like beer"-stm
The distinction between "their own money"
and … I’m not even sure what money is being imagined as not theirs … is artificial.
Each owner has a stake in the partnership which runs the team. If the team makes money, each partner’s equity is increased, and it can be collected as a dividend. If the team loses money, each partner’s equity is reduced, and if that continues to the point where the team is undercaptialized, the partners will be called upon to make capital contributions.
Ultimately, any distinction between the team’s money and the owner’s “own” money is just bookkeeping. It all washes out the same. Either you make money on the investment or you lose money on it.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Off Topic: Fernando Martinez on waivers from Mets
Former top prospect, still only 23 years old (or so he says) – bust so far, but the guy still has a ton of talent and only 23 years old – Beane needs to jump on this grenade – not much to lose other then someone on the 40 man
Lance "you sunk my" Blankenship
Let's acknowledge that Beane has been human (i.e., he's made mistakes)
This thread is great, but it has that “either or” feel to it. Things that seem certain:
1. Most draft picks don’t work out. But a lot of that is due to the steep competition. You can’t give everyone a fair shake; there are only 9 or 10 guys in the lineup at once and only 25 on the roster.
2. Beane hasn’t been much worse (if at all) than others when it’s come to drafting.
3. We’ve lost out on free agents who simply would rather play somewhere else.
4. The non-Yankee (or Giant or Angel) budget restricts player acquisition.
But he’s still messed up a few times;
1. He’s given contracts to players when the good data suggests he shouldn’t: Arthur Rhodes (as a Closer), Mike Holtz (My favorite – 2 year contract), Karros, Sheets ($10 million???), several more.
2. He decides on his “holy grails” and then gets them after they’re done being holy or were never holy to begin with, then he gets disappointed and tosses them: Durazo, Kendall, Cust, etc. He gets a hard-on for some guys and then doesn’t notice when they end up not really fitting the bill. Remember when he stuck Kotsay and Kielty at the top of the order and then wondered why that didn’t work out? He had all the info he needed on that one, no?
3. He’s a traditional baseball guy in his belief in his Golden Boys. How long of a rope did he give Booby Crosby and what sort of change was he hoping for? Did he just cross his fingers every time Croz came up to bat?
4. Like many fans, owners, GMs and others he loves the home run a bit too much. Why else would he expect Kouz to be great at the Coli? And remember Kieth Ginter?
So we can’t say that Beane has done good or done bad overall, but we can say he’s blown it in really obvious ways with players he just seemed to have gut-level faith in.
There also may be factors in the organizational culture of the A’s but let’s save that one for another time.
by Mark H on Jan 9, 2012 2:22 PM PST reply actions 3 recs
Well put.
Especially the part that Beane has a significant old-school side, which I think is commonly overlooked due to the “Moneyball” hype.
Your profile says you’ve been an AN member for a long time but haven’t been around much recently. If that’s true, welcome back! We’re glad to have you.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Thanks Iglew and dwish'
I’ve been on since AN v1.0, but I only speak when inspired, and more writing = less reading. I just figured out FIP, for fecksakes! Not enough hours in the day etc.
I think BB’s old school and baseball insider qualities are very much overlooked so that the whole A’s organization is seen as unique and modern when it’s basically a streamlined bunch of long-time baseball execs, Coliseum stalwarts, and local-yokel seasonal workers. And don’t tell me BB’s never repaid a favor to an agent, signed a guy he felt sorry for, or indulged a personal hunch that he knew was just that.
BTW, remember how his Best Man was the Manager? Is anyone still amazed by that even after all this time?! Where does nepotism fit into the modern world of the sexy and clever, numbers-driven leader?
Ka-ching
But remember it was that same nepotism that got the Dodgers to draft Mike Piazza.
There are really two questions here:
1. Is it possible to avoid non-injury related busts in the first round and find the best players?
2. Can you be smart drafting in the later rounds, or given all considerations, is it really a crapshoot?
I agree with you re: injuries
There was that study regarding the arm slot that Strasburg threw at showing that he was due for Tommy John. Of course, like every other article coming to mind today, I can’t find it.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
This might be it
From Tom Verducci in Sports Illustrated. I thought I saw one where it showed it visually. But maybe that isn’t real. But if you can avoid this sort of thing… through seeing poor mechanics that’d lead to injury it can save you a lot of grief as an org.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Yeah, we're all waiting on that time bomb
The canonical example is of course the cautionary tale of the Cubs. Titled Inverted W’s And You it stars two highly touted first round picks, Kerry Wood and Mark Prior. You can just about see the Cubs having a World Series run when suddenly the rotation falls to pieces.
Great post
And it’s great that Jonah Keri joined the discussion. And I really appreciate the time and effort dwishinsky has spent countering all my arguments. Thank you too!
Haha! Awesome post.
Thank you for spending the time as well! :D
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Nice post, but...
He decides on his "holy grails" and then gets them after they’re done being holy or were never holy to begin with, then he gets disappointed and tosses them: Durazo, Kendall, Cust, etc.
How was Jack Cust ever a “holy grail”? Even if he was a holy grail at some point, in 2007 (the year he was acquired) he put up a .393 wOBA. Beane didn’t get Cust after he was done being good, as his best years were in Oakland and they were pretty decent.
Also, didn’t Durazo have a couple of good years in Oakland?
To me, these “holy grails” seem to be more of the Conor Jackson variety rather than the Cust or Durazo variety.
All we gave up for Durazo was Jason Arnold,
a Yankees 2nd-rounder who was included in the three-way trade where we got Ted Lilly. He never amounted to anything.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
He married Roseanne, didn't he? :)
"Trying not to rec a "F**k the Giants" post is like trying not to look at boobs."-anonymous
"i guess i just like beer"-stm
Meh. The biggest mistake is the Holliday trade.
Sheets was for a year, Rhodes was a bad closer (but still a closer), Holtz was a reliever, Karros was only around for a year. Cust was our best player for several years. Crosby should have been better, but fell off a cliff. Same with Kouz. All those moves made sense at the time.
That’s not to say Beane’s not had some head-scratchers. Conor Jackson last year? Coco in 2012? Fuentes for 2 years? He has made some mistakes, but only one that I think has significantly set the organization back over time.
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 10, 2012 12:22 PM PST up reply actions
Coco in 2012 makes sense
With Coco, the A’s have exactly one starting OF’er. The kids will get plenty opportunities to play in LF, RF, 4th OF’, DH, and 1B. And, for what it’s worth, Coco is a veteran who can help the prospects develop, he is a good clubhouse personality, and he seems to genuinely like it in Oakland. Oh, yeah, and the A’s have to spend the revenue sharing money on improving the team on the field anyway.
What doesn’t make sense is Conor Jackson or Brian Fuentes or Matt Holliday. There are others, too. I don’t see how Cust or Coco can be head-scratchers.
Coco can very easily be a head-scratcher...
A guy with a terrible OBP but top of the order speed, a far below average CF arm and lengthy injury history, on the wrong side of 30 being given two-years. While I strongly feel it is a bad move, I can still see it as debatable. But it can easily be viewed as a head-scratcher.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
I just think Beane didn't trust Cowgill or Reddick at CF.
Otherwise, Dejesus made more sense to keep.
"When you find your way. Then you see it disappear."
Who says he has to hit at the top of the order?
If he can put up 2 WAR or more like he has the last couple seasons (I think 5 WAR or so for the A’s), then his contract is a bargain. The money has to be spent, the A’s have no MLB OF’ers other than him, and he’s a good personality for the up-and-coming kids to be around. Even if he only plays 120 games each year it still makes sense. Plus, you know, he can always be traded mid-season.
Makes sense to me.
While it may make sense to you...
You can’t deny that there is very clear room for debate.
The value of his speed is diminished batting more in the middle of the order where his bat sort of better fits if separated from his speed. I think that money could’ve been spent better on starting pitching which would fetch far more at the trade deadline. Furthermore the two years I think was nonsensical if you decide that as you wrote “the money has to be spent, the A’s have no MLB OF’ers other than him”.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
to play devil's advocate
please tell me WHERE you point out that it isn’t greed or stupidity which causes teams to draft poorly
"If people don't know who he is, they'd better turn on the television and check him out."
I suppose the opposite is true.
That one can purposefully draft poorly. In my post I do not address those topics, however the A’s spending on the draft sort of indicates a lack of greed, and I think the A’s are drafting at a level similar to all their competitors which should indicate a lack of stupidity or at worst a shared stupidity with every other MLB franchise.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
A Refreshing Perspective
As for Mr. Keri’s interesting comment about greed playing a role in the A’s demise, my barber—an immigrant and a fountain of entertaining enlightenment—remarked: “In future, after revolution, all teams owned by the state…all players paid same amount….no more greed, no more bullshit…. no more WAR….only peace. Everyone equal. Viva La Revolution.” […and a Happy New Yea!r]
I don't really like the stat that shows what percentage of draftees made the bigs...
Players in the Pirates system have a much greater chance at playing in the bigs than do players in the Red Sox system.
Clarification...
The exact same player has a better chance of reaching the bigs in the Pirates system than the Red Sox.
by Brett Narloch on Jan 10, 2012 6:59 AM PST up reply actions
Agreed, completely.
I included it because it isn’t easy to decide simply on what makes a draft successful. If you have one guy hit it huge like an Albert Pujols, your entire draft class is great. But what if he is the only one? Is that as good as a team that is able to get 6 or 7 fulltime players? Just a different metric to throw in there (and interestingly while steadier it isn’t all together that steady either from year-to-year)
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
There's also this....
My guess is that at a certain point towards the middle or end of the draft, all players become crapshoots no matter what. The best players are gone and now you’re picking younger players who might go to college, players with ambition but minimal skills, your brother-in-law’s dentist’s son, etc.
The question isn’t the first round, when presumably barring injury or bad mechanics, a team should be able to make a good choice, or after the fourth round, when the pickings are slim - but in those second, third, and fourth rounds, which I think is key to a good or bad draft. Of course, having a scout or two in the organization with any kind of positive track record that goes beyond one or two lucky hits would at that point make a huge difference.
I think it is an interesting question
what is the most efficient allocation of the scouting resource. If you have a set amount to spend, do you get more for your money if you focus all your brainpower thinking very carefully about exactly who is the best bet with your 1st round pick, or is it better to go look around at all the lesser guys trying to find hidden gems among the guys in the last 50 rounds?
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
I'd be willing to bet the Rays and Jays are doing exactly that.
Focusing on latter rounds and relying on consensus opinion for earlier rounds.
"When you find your way. Then you see it disappear."
Don't most teams do that, even the unsuccessful ones?
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 3:39 PM PST up reply actions
But is that the best choice?
I honestly was posing the question, not rhetorically assuming the latter was better.
This discussion has suggested that it’s the 1st round pick that’s going to make the big difference and the latter rounds are even more crapshooty than the first. If the first round is where the real value is, maybe it does make more sense focus all your attention on making sure you get Evan Longoria instead of Luke Hochevar, or Jacoby Ellsbury instead of Jeff Clement.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
That is a very interesting question.
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:51 PM PST up reply actions
I absolutely think it's the best choice.
There are different forces at work in the 1st round. In that case, it’s more about organizational philosophy than it is about scouting information. Everyone has the same info on these guys, in the early rounds you need to be looking for that “something extra” that will give you the edge. As an example, Dayton Moore will often focus on personality traits (4th, 5th, and 6th responses) he believes are harbingers of success.
It’s important not to think of these things as pure probabilities like rolling dice. There are reasons some people draft well and some draft poorly. Honestly, it could be as simple as the latter rounds having more players which increases the chance you’re drafting guys based on poor data due to the fact you don’t have the resources to scout all of them. In that case, yeah, it’s a crapshoot. I refuse to believe luck is fueling the RayJay scouting hits in the latter rounds.
"When you find your way. Then you see it disappear."
Well, generally speaking, it's better to consolidate your production in as few players as possible
as that allows you to add incrementally more WAR in the open positions.
However, part of the draft is finding depth, solid regulars and role players. If you take your question to the extreme and say that for eight straight drafts the only players who put up anything remotely resembling positive WAR in the big leagues in their careers are a total of five studs, you may have trouble fielding a complete team that has any sort of depth or injury insurance. Of course, you could just go ahead and trade one of those five for all the solid regulars and depth you need if you were so inclined.
In the stars-and-scrubs scenario, I would be happy to have the stars and worry about dealing with the scrubs later. The ideal situation though would be to hit on the one big star in most of your successful draft classes and have an occasional “group of solid regulars and role players” success class.
Get out the time-fracture wickets, Hobbes! We're gonna play Calvinball!
by UrgentMirth on Jan 10, 2012 11:13 AM PST up reply actions
we can always grab moscosos, rajai davises, sizemores, etc.
by Billy Frijoles on Jan 10, 2012 12:43 PM PST up reply actions
I don't like random people grabbing my Moscoso
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 10, 2012 12:52 PM PST up reply actions
Oh, well, in that case
disregard the party invitation I just sent you.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
I think this coming draft will be and interesting study
and followup to this intriguing discussion. It is supposedly a very deep draft class, and we do have more picks in the first 2 rounds than we’ve had in some years – AND with the new CBA restrictions on slot spending, the results might shed some light on the above speculations.
Thanks for the excellent article, dwishinsky, and thanks for the thoughtful replies, Jonah.
Thank you.
The CBA will really change how things work and it’ll be interesting to see the ramifications.
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
Just Curious:
What is everyone i thoughts on player development? it seems that everyone here assumes that it is equal accross baseball. That it is all on who you draft. But, take for the A’s for example, they seem to be have a lot more success in developing pitchers then hitters. Even some good looking highly projected hitters seem to go backwards with the A’s (Taylor, Barton) after the A’s acquired them and a lot of the position players seem to take a lot of time to reach the majors and really do not look like they have a very high ceiling.
How much is it player development and how much of it is actually drafting the right guys?
ogallalabob
Don't have time for a super thoughtful response right now
But, I don’t think it’s any accident that the A’s blow at developing hitters when the MLB home park is terrifically pitcher-friendly and the AAA affiliate home park is ridiculously hitter-friendly (in a hitter-friendly league).
"I'll guarantee this: The A's will have a better season in 2012." - George Zimmer
by cuppingmaster on Jan 10, 2012 3:08 PM PST up reply actions
Then how were they good at it when Tejada, Chavez and Giambi were coming up?
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 3:09 PM PST up reply actions
Tejada, Chavez and Giambi
reached the big leagues in 1997, 1998, and 1995.
Sacramento became the A’s AAA affiliate in 2000.
I don’t know how the Vancouver or Edmonton parks played, but clearly what Cup is suggesting would not have applied the same then. (Also the PCL divisions have bounced around over the years, so frequent opponents would have changed as well.)
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Vancouver was not a hitters' park, but Edmonton was even more of one than Sacramento
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:51 PM PST up reply actions
I think we can all agree both Edmonton and Vancouver were less Canadian than Sacramento though.
But seriously, folks....
But is it the same system
It seems to me that the A’s have gone to more of a system totally looking at maximizing pitch counts/walks, I also doubt you have the same hitting coaches up and down the system that you have in the 90’s.
To me comparing hitting to golf/ golf swings. A sport where there are a lot of instructors who have a lot of diferent therories and a lot of diferent levels of success teaching those therories. Would not a baseball swing and at bat attitudes be somewhat similar? Where the margin between success and failure is so small and unperdictable it would seem to me that coaching/development would play a key roll and may make a lot of diference in outcomes.
Also going back 15 years to look for successes really does not give someone a warm fuzzy feeling regarding the future of position players in th organization.
ogallalabob
Yes
agree.. Keri is way off-base.
agree.. Keri is way off-base.For small market teams, like us (Pirates) and y’all, it’s all about windows.
by McCutchenIsTheTruth on Jan 10, 2012 3:05 PM PST reply actions
I think it's obvious that dwishinsky is helping keep AN's window open as a great blog.
I’m a fan of Jonah Keri’s work but I had mixed feelings about his article on Grantland.
But seriously, folks....
Thank you!
One day you can flip me for younger bloggers?
Visit my blog the Todd Van Poppel Rookie Card Retirement Plan!!
The biggest issue I have with Keri's article, and his response in this thread
is his failure to dichotomize the economic landscape of baseball in 2001 and in 2012. In 2001 there were a slew of poor teams, so it was almost likely that a few of them would be playoff-caliber. Now there’s pretty much two, Oakland and Tampa Bay.
Other teams like the Mets and Dodgers are financially restricted due to incompetent ownership, and others like Cleveland are poor despite a nice stadium, but at least those are self-inflicted wounds. Any way you slice it, Oakland and Tampa Bay are the only teams taking the short end of the MLB revenue stick.
which makes competition tougher
It’s one thing when the high end talent is loaded on to three or four teams, but when free agent impact stars are going to St. Louis and Anaheim and Texas just as often as they’re going to NYY and Boston, that makes it tougher for the poor teams that remain.
The Forbes numbers don't support that.
In terms of gross revenues, the Jays, Royals, Pirates, Padres, and Marlins are all about the same as the A’s and Rays. The Jays probably have separate TV income not reflected in the Forbes numbers, so you can cross them out, and we can expect the Marlins revenues will go up with the new stadium. That still leaves five poor teams, not two. And there’s still a huge discrepancy between the large group of “middle-class” teams and the handful of truly rich ones.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
Is five fewer than in 2001 or the same?
tko bira, masturbira -- Croatian proverb quoted by elcroata
by WaddellCanseco on Jan 10, 2012 8:53 PM PST up reply actions
I don't think the Forbes numbers go back to 2001.
It wouldn’t be too hard to put the numbers for whatever years they do have into an Excel file and make some charts. But I’ve got other unfinished projects, so I’ll leave that one to someone else.
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
I'm using next year so the Marlins don't count
as they have spent like drunken sailors this offseason. The Padres are like the Mets and Dodgers, suffering from self-inflicted ownership related wounds. The Pirates are in the Cleveland camp with a nice shiny stadium, but low attendance due to a bad baseball team (the fans would show up to PNC if they won some games). The Royals may be a third poor team, but they at least have a recently renovated stadium.
My qualifications for “poor team” meant a team that is a victim of external circumstances (read: a bad stadium). The other teams mentioned are either losing revenue due to having a bad on-field product, or because their ownership is inept.
As for the gap between “middle-class” teams and ultra-rich teams, the middle class teams now aren’t truly “middle-class”, as they all now at least have the resources to pay at least a couple of superstars at market prices (SF, STL, TEX, WAS).
Marlins have been a special case
Twice they built World Series teams through outrageous overspending, then sold off the players and started again with prospects.
They can’t do it again because teams will no longer give up their best prospects for top talent.
Wait...what?...AN is free?.....why did they ask for my credit card info then?
Oh and when is AN going to give me that money my Uncle in Nigeria has waiting for me?
But seriously, folks....
I spent
two years in Port Harcourt Nigeria in the ’70s, and I think I met your uncle!!
by robertmelvin on Jan 10, 2012 9:46 PM PST up reply actions
You can't miss him...since we're related he would just be the goofiest looking bastard you ever saw.
But seriously, folks....
Harcooourt!
Baseball is a stupid-making enterprise in that nobody wants to be singled out or say something dumb. —Michael Lewis
by iglew on Jan 10, 2012 10:25 PM PST up reply actions 1 recs
I was there '75 and '76
and it was more or less occupied by Hausa military police from the north, after the Biafra War defeat of the Ibos from neighboring provinces. It was peaceful, so to say, with an 11 pm curfew everynight, which made for some great all night duplicate bridge sessions with Italian friends working for AGIP. Not much baseball then, though, except an occasion MLB game on Armed Forces Radio.
by robertmelvin on Jan 14, 2012 4:13 AM PST up reply actions
I'm not going to fault Beane for the quality of his draft picks.
The draft is a crapshoot, and just a little bit of bad luck can make a decent draft look terrible (if he’d kept Ethier, Powell didn’t have health and injury problems, and Desme hadn’t retired, would this thread even exist?). However, I think the A’s largely ignored the IFA market for far too long. They really should have invested a lot more in scouting and signing IFA’s.
"The Lord has blessed us with birthday cake!"
Apologies if this went up elsewhere.
I’m blowing this popcicle stand, and don’t have time to look around.
Good article by Passan on the issues being discussed here.
http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=jp-passan_hot_stove_daily_oakland_athletics_011112
Comments For This Post Are Closed
Secondary Sidebar
User Tools
Related FanPosts on Athletics Nation
Related FanShots on Athletics Nation
FanPosts
Community blog posts and discussion.
Recommended FanPosts
Recent FanPosts
Baseball Nation Recent Stories
In Association With
Big League Stew - MLB - Yahoo! Sports
- Barry Bonds thinks it will be ‘very sad’ if he doesn’t get into the Hall on his first try
- Chris Johnson’s glove webbing had a Spidey sense at Coors Field — for one play, at least
- Jonathan Lucroy breaks hand after suitcase falls during search for sock
- The Juice: Long Adam Dunn homer punctuates Chris Sale’s 15 Ks, Mark Trumbo goes deep after Jered Weaver goes down for Angels
- Leyland begs media to make umpires ‘accountable’ for bad calls (VIDEO)
