Counter Point: Why Beane's 2011 draft strategy makes sense

Toronto GM Alex Anthopoulos (just wanted to spell his name for once) is pretty much the undisputed champ at that right now.

But let’s look at some of the other moves Beane has made since last offseason.

He traded Rajai Davis for (this is the abridged version) a bullpen arm that’s expected to be a full time contributor in 2012 and his starting 3B.

He traded Corey Brown and Henry Rodriguez for Josh Willingham.

He traded Vin Mazzaro and Justin Marks for David DeJesus. I’ll admit DeJesus has not performed anywhere near as expected but this horrid performance could not have been foreseen by Beane. Unless you believe this is DeJesus’ no performance level going forward there is little risk in offering him arbitration at the end of the year. He’ll either stay in Oakland for 1 more year or turn into a draft pick. I liked Justin Marks a lot but 9 times out of 10 you deal A-ball lefties with average to above average stuff for 1 year of a big league outfielder plus a draft pick.

He traded Ziggy, his #3 RH bullpen arm, for what looks to be his starting 1B and a live lefty arm that throws mid-90 gas.

So far it looks like the A’s are going to come out ahead in all those deals. Beane might not have been able to stockpile the draft picks but he’s still finding ways to add talent to the roster.

I’m not saying anything you wrote is “wrong”… I just don’t agree with it. I should probably go back and read old threads to get a more accurate accounting of how AN felt about the trades for DeJesus and Willingham; but i’m too damn tired to put in that kind of work. So I’m going to base my ENTIRE response off the info you’ve provided.

That at least a fair number of amateurs on the internet were able to do the math and confirm that the 2011 A’s (including Willingham and DeJesus) were no better than a low-mid 80s win team

The A’s haven’t had a winning season since 2006. What is wrong with fielding a team that conservatively estimated to win up to 85 games? The way I saw it… a projected 85 win team is at least in a position to take advantage of a Texas collapse. Or if a you get a big FA-walk-year performance from Willingham and/or DeJesus then your 85 win team is looking at an 88 win season. Another positive break here-or-there and now we could be talking 90 wins; which as long as Texas or Anaheim didn’t go all 2001 Mariners on the AL West would have meant the A’s were in contention.

The A’s had attendance issues, stadium issues, questions about the manager, maybe even contraction whispers in the air and the one thing that could take the pressure off all of those things would be a winning season in 2011. I know some people have argued that if the team can’t realistically make the playoffs than they should tank the season and get better draft picks but at some point you have to build a team that can reasonably be expected to WIN more than 81 ballgames. Beane didn’t base his decision to build a possible winner on the “wisdom of the crowd”… the crowd figured out and confirmed the wisdom of Beane’s decision. You say this is a firmly below average big league team; yet all the predictive data we had prior to Opening Day suggested this would be an above average team. That’s why you play the games.

Furthermore, the timeline is important here. Beane traded for DeJesus in November, Willingham in December and pursued Beltre into January. Two solid outfielders and a “star” in Beltre would have been exactly the recipe the sceptics asked for.

You bring up the 2009 Holliday trade. I don’t see that as a mistake so much as a high-risk gamble with low odds of paying out. Beane’s deals during the 2010-2011 offseason were in no way similar to the Holliday trade. Beane dealt (with the possible exception of Henry Rodriguez) what was essentially organizational fodder for DeJesus and Willingham. Street and CarGon offered more value than the 4 guys Beane dealt to land his new outfielders. His attempt to build a winning ballclub in 2011 had a minimal impact, if any, on the long term goals of the Oakland A’s.

I don’t feel the A’s 2011 draft was a poor one. In my opinion, landing Gray was a boon and the rest of the draft class is fairly solid. I give it a C+. Which could certainly be better but is far from the “poor” rating you suggest. We’re looking at the same draft class but our perceptions, the things we are looking for are different and that leads to two conflicting opinions.

Mine is, of course, the right one. :-)

I don’t think the farm system is barren. It’s not ready to produce an abundance of big league ready talent but the raw material is there in the low minors to improve the ballclub in 2-3 years. Put another way, if the A’s had 3-4 Jurickson Profar’s in Low-A or further down the food chain, would you still call the farm barren? Hell no! Would they be ready to help the A’s in 2012? Hell no!

Beane is going to catch flak for dealing CarGon to the Rockies for as long as he remains in Oakland. Gonzalez’s emergence in Colorado was the risk Beane took to land Holliday. Very few people would be griping if Carlos had flamed out like Greg Smith did. But that’s not what happened. I don’t blame you for questioning the logic and/or reasoning behind Beane’s moves; in fact, I encourage it. But you need to keep perspective and you need to be able to judge his moves on an individual basis as well as part of an overall scheme. A lot of people questioned Beane’s move when he traded for Holliday and the masses were proven right. A lot of those same people questioned the various trades Beane made this last offseason and it’s looking like Beane is going to come out ahead.

Keep that in mind the next time Beane makes a move.

It was Paris, Texas ‘cause you’re a cheapskate but “Paris” nonetheless.

It would require a much looser interpretation of “misfit” than is implied with “Jeremy Brownesque” but I don’t see why you couldn’t do that.

I admit to not being as dialed in on the draft this year as I have been in the past. But Peters, Kilcrease and Granier represent the A’s 16th, 30th and 32nd round picks. I mean, if a team is going to go all mad scientist and experiment with a bunch of smaller pitchers than you’re not risking much by using those picks to try things out.

As for the raw position prospects you mentioned, I have a theory as to the motivation behind Oakland’s interest. Part of it is money… raw high-ceiling HS prospects probably have a college scholarship beckoning them into academia and that means the A’s need to pay more to land the player. A college Junior or Senior doesn’t have that leverage and would be more inclined to sign at or around slot. Another part is training. On average, a college player has received better training and instruction than a high school player. The typical college player probably has a better work ethic than the typical high school player.

College players also have (again, on average) more life experience than a high school player. You draft some 17 year old kid and he might not even know how to boil water! I can pretty much guarantee you most college draft picks have at least figured out Top Ramen.

Finally, the A’s have a lot more data on the raw college prospects than they do on the high school guys. The A’s drafted Bobby Crocker out of high school back in 2008. They have 3 more years of data, of watching him mature and grow as a ballplayer, to make an informed guess as to how he’ll turn out once he receives pro instruction. I’m not going to guarantee Crocker’s success, merely highlight some of the advantages gained by pursuing the raw college talent.

rec’d.

I’m reluctant to give the A’s the benefit of the doubt because I don’t think the A’s have had much success in the later rounds; the Phillies, for example, who can boast that they drafted Cozart, Singleton, and Dom Brown with late-round overslot bonuses, have had great success in the unheralded rounds of the draft in the last five years in my opinion.

I would be more likely to give the team the benefit of the doubt if 1.) They had drafted really well in the last six years, which I don’t think they have; or 2.) if they were making a radical departure from their previous drafting philosophy, which is basically what I was advocating in my original post. I don’t really think they did either of those things, and that’s why I’m pessimistic.

That said, grover pointed out that some of the late-round, short right-handed pitchers have some intrigue because of their velocity, and some of the college position players are very good athletes, which I like.

he’s far more willing to be complicit in that long-term plan.