Why you can't have too much young pitching.

by thinwhiteduke on Jan 12, 2009 10:46 AM PST Comment 8 comments

With John Sickels soon to be releasing his newest prospect book, I decided to take a peak at his 2002 book, back when he was still with Stats, INC. What struck me was just how many of the top pitching prospects from that year went on to completely flop. Now I know this was just one season, and a more complete analyisis over a greater time period could presumably yield some significant changes in the results. But I'm not going to take the time to do such an exhaustive examination, sorry.

Anyway, I looked at the top 24 pitching prospects from that class. All of these guys were rated between an A and a B+. Most were getting pretty close to being ML ready, since Sickels rarely hands out a super high grade to pitchers still working in the lower minors. If you're interested in taking a look at how they have since fared, please continue reading.

Here's a quick breakdown:

4 never even reached the Majors.

7 others made no meaningful contribution. That is to say, they ended up with less than one Win Share over their career totals.

So a total of 11 of the 24 can only be described as complete busts.

Only 9 at this point in time are likely to contribute anything meaningful in the future. The others are either out of the game or barely hanging on.

Only 4, maybe 5, have thus far pitched at an "all-star" level for any significant amount of time. And yes, I know that description is vague and subjective, and no, I'm not going to define it better than that.

Interestingly, in this already admittedly tiny sample size, an A grade did seem to have significance over the B+ guys. Of the five who scored an A or A-, only Dennis Tankersley completely "tanked". (The other 4 were Beckett, Juan Cruz, Prior, and Peavy).

What's my point to all this? Well, I guess it just shows how incredible the A's track record has been in turning their high grade pitching prospects into useful players at the Major League level. It also demonstrates why Billy Beane is so loathe to give out contract extensions to pitchers past their arbitration years. It just isn't a good bet. It certainly sheds light on why all of our top performing starters have either been traded away or were allowed to walk away over the last five years or so. Because in many cases, even the ones who do work out have a small window for truly being effective (Mulder & Zito prime examples).

So, that is why Billy has hoarded so many good arms, and why we won't keep them for more than a few years, even if they do manage to reach the top level. It is also why we can only hold our breath and hope that Cahill and Anderson turn out more like a Jake Peavy or Josh Beckett, or at least a Brett Myers or Adam Wainwright, and not a Jeff Heaverlo or Kenny Baugh.

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I fail to see

how the ratio of highly graded minor league pitchers turning into bona fide major league contributors correlates with not giving extensions to active major league pitchers beyond their arbitration years. I’ll grant you the title of your diary makes sense given your analysis, as no matter how good a pitcher may be graded you never know how they’re going to be on the ML level. But a completely separate analysis would be needed to make your second point. To use just two examples of players whom you cite, once Beckett & Peavy became established, wouldn’t locking them into long-term deals make sense if you can afford it?

by sslinger on Jan 12, 2009 11:16 AM PST reply actions 0 recs

Extensions for Beckett & Peavy

It might make sense if you are the Red Sox. Not so much if you are the A’s. The cost vs the likelihood of them remaining healthy and productive throughout the lifetime of the contract does not make great sense for a small market team.

"Errors of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it."
-Thomas Jefferson

by thinwhiteduke on Jan 12, 2009 11:20 AM PST up reply actions 0 recs

Stated another way...

the heavy attrition rate doesn’t suddenly end once the player reaches and establishes himself at the ML level, it just is less severe. This is why 4 of the 13 who at some point made a meaningful contribution have, in the course of only a few years, completely washed out. And several others who are still pitching have probably seen their best years already behind them.

"Errors of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it."
-Thomas Jefferson

by thinwhiteduke on Jan 12, 2009 11:54 AM PST up reply actions 0 recs

still, I think I get a little lost in your argument

because you don’t make a distinction between pitchers not panning out because of injury and pitchers that don’t pan out for non-injury related reasons.

In the minors, both of these scenarios have a significant probability (side note: in some cases perhaps it’s difficult to distinguish between the two).
In the majors, however, you have a much better projection of how a pitcher will perform in the future if they don’t get injured, but you still have the injury factor.

The common argument (I have no idea if this is how ML teams actually think, or if it makes sense… I’m just saying I hear this a lot), is that for young, minor league talent, you stockpile because of BOTH the risks of injury and non-injury flameouts. For the majors, on the other hand, you can make a much more accurate prediction if a player is headed downhill (Zito… though it was tough to foresee the magnitude), but you still have to worry about injuries (Mulder).

Save Rajai Davis

by oakinboston on Jan 12, 2009 12:20 PM PST up reply actions 0 recs

Of course,

All of what you state is true, but this was meant to be a quick and dirty little snapshot, not an in-depth analysis. Admittedly, all I’m doing in this post is scratching the outer surface.

"Errors of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it."
-Thomas Jefferson

by thinwhiteduke on Jan 12, 2009 12:45 PM PST up reply actions 0 recs

Good diary

Because in many cases, even the ones who do work out have a small window for truly being effective (Mulder & Zito prime examples).

A fairly contrarian position but probably more accurate than any fan would care to admit. The window, the shelf-life, or whatever one wants to call it, is preety narrow in most cases; the perverbial catching lightning in a bottle.

Sure, there many pitchers who remain effective for year. but if one were to do any serious analysis, one would likely walk away realizing that the vast majority of ball players [particularly pitchers] either never pan out; are serviceable at the replacement level for a few years; have moderate-length mediorce careers; have stellar performance for a brief period of years; or are solid — but not stellar — for any length of time.

It is a rarity to get a long period of dominance from any pitcher. Yet the fans almost wish it to be true. “Let’s go out and get an ace” you here the calls. But, by the time someone can establish themselves as the so-called ace, they’re prohibitively costly both in terms of dollars per year but how many years, at a minimum, you can get them to sign for.

Personally, I like seeing young and productive pitchers move on when the begin really getting pricey and watching new guys step up. Rather see that than Kevin Brown get $15 million for another three seaons after he’s toast. And you’ve got to know that the Yankees are playing with fire with Burnett for five and CC for seven.

by LowcountryJoe on Jan 13, 2009 4:28 PM PST reply actions 0 recs