24. Kelly Johnson, 26. Yunel Escobar, 25. Francoeur is 24. Jair Jurrjens is 24. All of these guys have value for the future.

The holes that they do have, in CF, in the corner OF spots, even 1b, assuming that they don’t sign Teixeira to a new contract, can be filled by Schafer, Hernandez, Heyward, Brandon Jones.

The team has already been rebuilding, and is already somewhat rebuilt. As for committing more resources for this push, that’s why I suggested that they would want starters, more than relievers. Especially starting pitchers who will be under control for the next several years. Especially for players who will be surplus. Lillibridge is blocked at SS and 2b. And Schafer and Hernandez are both CFs. They’re better trading some surplus positions players for starting pitchers, especially since they’ve been good at developing position players, but not so much starters.

The Braves have surplus talent in the up the middle positions, but need pitchers, the A’s have surplus pitching, but need SSs, CFs, possibly 2bs.

Of the other teams, like the Tigers, that are desperately in need of pitching, none really have the players that would fill important needs on the A’s.

we can reverse engineer just how good LaPorta will have to be for the suggested trade to make sense.

First, let’s handle the Gaudin for “live arm” swap. Gaudin projects as about a league-average pitcher for the next three years (on average; his upside and downside are both considerable). Without knowing who the other pitcher is, let’s guess that he has a 20% chance of being 10 runs over average, a 20% chance of being average, a 20% chance of being 10 runs below average, and a 40% chance of being replacement level or worse (which I’ll call 20 runs below average). During the three years when both would be pitching for Oakland, the live arm is about 8 runs per year worse than Gaudin. He does provide some possibility of value in years 4-6, while the only value Gaudin provides is through potential compensation picks. (I’m not even going to try and handle those. But what value they do provide will probably be greater under the keep-Street scenario.) However, most of that value is in easily-obtained “marginal player runs” (i.e. the value of a guy who is above replacement but below average).

Next there’s the lost value of Street himself. Despite what AN seems to think, this is very considerable. PECOTA thinks Street has the highest upside of any relief pitcher in baseball. The next three-odd seasons will likely be among the best in his career. If he even just matches his performance to this point, he will be around 15 runs above average. Again, let’s give the trade the benefit of the doubt. We’ll say he stays on his current tack.

Finally, we have to measure the effect of demoting the player that LaPorta replaces. Right now the A’s have a huge number of players in the outfield and 1B positions, but it seems likely that the lineup of the near future will come out of this group:
Carlos Gonzalez
Aaron Cunningham
Travis Buck
Daric Barton
Chris Carter
Ryan Sweeney
Sean Doolittle
Jack Cust

LaPorta will basically be replacing the 5th best of this group of 8. (3 outfield positions, 1B, DH.) I kind of like the upside of these guys, m’self; I think the A’s should easily be able to stock those 5 positions with players who are average or better. Again giving the trade the benefit of the doubt, let’s say the worst of the bunch is league-average. Let’s also assume that the A’s are able to move that guy for some return—say half his value in VORP, since the team will be dealing from a position of weakness.

OK. Let’s add this all up here. In runs over average, for the first three years:

-8 Gaudin swap -15 Street = 23 runs lost.

In runs over replacement: -8 Gaudin swap -35 Street -20 position player replacement =63 runs lost.

For the remaining three years, by RAA:

-8 Gaudin swap = 8 runs lost

By RAR:

+12 Gaudin swap -20 position player = 8 runs lost

Summing up in total, the team loses 69+24=93 runs above average and 189+24=213 runs above replacement. These numbers actually square up somewhat nicely. If we assume LaPorta plays 6.5 seasons his value looks very similar under either of these metrics. Essentially, during his time in an Oakland uniform, LaPorta will need to be around 15 runs above average (33 above replacement) as a DH to even this trade out.

One more variable—LaPorta’s fielding. Let’s assume that he’s a standard DH type—a guy who would be 5 runs under average as a 1B, 10 under as a corner type, 15 under as a third baseman. So no matter where you put him, the positional adjustment and the effects of his fielding add up to 15 runs below average.

So: Relative to a global league-average hitter, to make this trade work out, I calculate that LaPorta will need to, in his average outcome, be around 30 runs over average, or 48 runs over replacement. It’s possible that there are math (or reasoning) errors in the above; if so, they are, I swear, unintentional. But as far as I can tell that trade’s success is premised on the concept that LaPorta projects as a hitter who is 30 RAA in his average outcome.

No offense, guys, but that strikes me as utterly ludicrous.