I don't know the answer. On the one hand, Goldstein quotes someone saying that "there’s a finite amount of money being spent, and the union knows that money saved in the draft is going to be redistributed to a union member, so they’re fine with it." On the other hand, he also states that "While everyone agrees that a real slot system would solve the problem of talent dropping, everyone also understands that even discussing the concept is moot, as the player’s union would never concede to it." Those statements at least appear to be in conflict. Maybe the union just doesn't want to agree to any formal system that could be viewed as a slippery slope to a salary scale for its own members. But really, I don't know.

pfaustin@travelers.com

more revenue which could lead to have a better team?  GASP! the A's might be a team in the top third of spending if they had a stadium that produced more revenue.  Sounds like a good long term plan to a better team to me

I'm guessing that the Callis study deals with the first category.

On the other hand, the second category is trickier to make blanket statements about. There's little doubt the draft achieves one of the things it's designed to achieve: It decreases draftees' negotiating leverage and creates a gap between the price paid and the true market value (you'd get something like market value with the international free agents, but the two are hard to compare directly since that class of player usually signs so much younger, among other differences). Given that gap, it's entirely possible that guys like Smoak or Brown could ask for something over slot (more than what teams are generally willing to pony up except for elite talents) but still be a bargain with respect to their real value. My impression is that the guys who truly overestimate their value, to the extent that they want more than their rationally projectable value, are probably considerably in the minority.

From the team's prespective, if you have a choice between one guy who's a good talent and likely to be an easy sign, and another who is a slightly better talent but who is likely to demand significantly more, presents a real risk of not signing at all, and who is likely to fight you for every dollar all through his arb years (in the case of Boras clients), you're probably right to choose the first player. The key there is that the second player is only a slightly better talent, not a substantially better talent, which would change the math. And the difference between 'slightly" and "substantially" is probably the difference between the two categories you cite.

Anyway, whatever the nuances, it seems clear that for the teams willing to deal with the internal MLB politics, there's a lot of extra value to be mined by working the system as it now exists. I wish our team was one of those willing & able to do this, because we're getting screwed by the teams that are.

especially since I let my BP subscription lapse due to some minor financial concerns.  It is sad really.  Glad this was posted.

I'm not totally convinced it is a "problem", though.  The A's have X amount of money to spend annually and I work under the assumption that every dollar not spent on signing draftees is spent on free agents, medical staff (snicker) or whatever else.  If this is the case, then I also assume that the front office staff works to optimize each marginal dollar spent.  Obviously there is a point where you can spend "too" much on signing draftees and maybe Billy spends up to that amount, but no more.

This all assumes a lot and I'm not sold on it either way.  No GM is infallable.  Billy may be making a mistake, I don't really know enough to say one way or the other.

It is also worth pointing out that, all else equal, the team with the most money will be the better team.  I don't think it is too much of a stretch to say that the gap between the A's front office and the front office of those teams you mentioned isn't nearly as great as some people may think.  If that is the case then the money advantage they have more than makes up for the front office advantage we have (assuming we have one).

Still, simple, direct, not unrealistic, and you argued a position-- something which a lot of writers are afraid to do these days. Good stuff.

I'm not sure I agree about the Gil Meche thing, though. I interpret that as the Royals really, genuinely overpaying to obtain him, and then getting lucky afterwards. Precisely because of the closing of the information gap, I think terms like "#1 starter" are going to be increasingly irrelevant to the process of pricing talent.

Some other thoughts inspired by the article: My morose side tells me that at some point, the competitive imbalance issue is going to have to be addressed. The A's made a good run for a while, but the times they are a-changin'. Breaking the slotting system for draft picks, once it's done by a poor team, might stave off the inevitable by another 5-10 years, but not more than that.

As cool as it is to see David beat Goliath, the constant unfairness of the situation is simply grinding. Of course, owners like the Pirates and Marlins are only making this harder to achieve, as they sock away millions in ill-gotten gains from revenue sharing while repeatedly failing to put a competitive product on the field.

A salary cap needs to be put in place, and it won't happen until the fans of the lousy teams vote with their feet.