Beane's End Game
by Taj Adib on Dec 20, 2007 2:15 PM PST
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PrintI'm not going to lie...I was more than a little disappointed after hearing that Dan Haren was traded for a bunch of prospects that I had heard little or nothing about. I went to Pepperdine while Dan was pitching for the Waves and knew then that he'd be a star, so his emergence last season as an elite starter was not unexpected. But as such, his departure from the Green and Gold was especially hard to swallow. I had long believed that if Dan were to be traded, he would net a King's ransom of the most coveted prospects in the game: guys like Clay Buchholz, Phil Hughes or Clayton Kershaw plus a high-upside bat or two. So I was taken aback when I heard that he was traded for a bundle of much lower-profile names.
But like virtually all of Billy Beane's personnel moves, this trade looks a whole lot better after a prolonged period of digestion.
You see, when Beane entered this off-season with the publicly stated goal of "rebuilding the farm system" he didn't mean to trade his best young players for one or two major league ready arms or one high-profile, can't miss prospect fresh from the AAA ranks. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now acknowledge that what he meant by this was that he wanted to stock the middle levels of the organization with as many players as possible that COULD be average or above-average major league players at some point in their careers. This is an important strategic shift.
Beane's most telling quote of the off-season, in my opinion, was this one, from the CC Times on October 2nd:
"Our long-term success is going to be based on our ability to stay an organic organization. Our foundation needs to be created from within. And regardless of our revenues, that's what I want anyway -- a situation where we're drafting and developing players."
Organic is the key word there. The A's absolutely need a steady-stream of talent from their farm system to stay consistently competitive. They do not need to develop an All Star or Rookie of the Year every few seasons; they need to constantly churn out major league quality players that can give the team several seasons of high-performance relative to their salaries - and then churn out more when those players move on from the organization when their performance starts equating to their paychecks. Kurt Suzuki, Travis Buck and Daric Barton are the prototypes in this effort: us A's fans are excited about them, but around baseball no one is considering these players future superstars - because they probably aren't.
But that's not a big deal. Barton, Suzuki and Buck all profile as average to above average all-around players. For a small market team, having three guys like that at key positions is invaluable. Beane's ultimate goal is to have that luxury at every position and not just here and there around the diamond. This is why Beane chose quantity over quality in the Haren trade and is likely to do so in future trades involving Blanton and/or Street.
By getting 5-6 players that profile as at least average major leaguers as opposed to 1 or 2 that are seen as future stars, Beane has not only diffused the risk involved with prospect development but has exponentially increased the future resources and level of competitiveness of the major league team by strengthening the organizational depth chart and establishing cost-control over a wide range of positions. In essence, Beane traded three seasons of cost control in one area (starting pitching) for 6+ years of cost control in several areas (starting pitching, outfield and corner infield).
As much as it saddens me to see Danny go, this is good news for the organization going forward, and I hope Beane does the exact same thing with Blanton within the next few weeks. I'd happily welcome a few more guys I've never heard of if that turns out to be the case.
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good diary
although i think it may also be a reaction to teams being less willing to give up A prospects. unfortunately, other teams with money seem to recognize the value of cost controlled young players and are less willing to part with them for even premium talent.
i doubt Beane would have said no to a package including the big names you outlined in the beginning– it just wasn't there. Beane took the most value where he could get it, and will continue to do so.
This is not a critique at all
but I'm wondering what the infatuation is with the term "key position." I understand that catcher, SS, and CF are important positions defensively, but we made it to the ALCS with subpar guys at each position in '06. I feel that when building a team you go for the best players there are, regardless of key positions. Obviously the ideal situation is to have good players at every position but I don't think a certain extra attention should be paid to one position over another.
The key is the time period ...
If we're looking at the 2008 A's, it doesn't matter which positions the team is strong and weak at, just the overall level of talent. If we're looking at the A's, over the next several years, however, it does. It's much easier to find quality players at RF/LF/1b/DH than SS/CF/C. We can always assume that we should be able to fill holes in those spots from the scrap heap/minor trades/minor free agents. We can't make those assumptions about the more difficult positions.
sorry devo
thats the second time I posted something just to see a post with the same idea right before it.
Nothing to apologize for ...
I like it when people agree with me ... makes me feel popular ...
Well
I'm not saying anybody we're looking at is the next ManRam, just using it as an example. I'm also not denying having a talented SS or CFer or Catcher is important, just that we shouldn't pay an exorbitant amount of attention to the position of the player if said player has obvious talent.
by Helloooo 1st on Dec 20, 2007 5:39 PM PST up reply actions
I think the opposite
If there are a shortage of good players at a certain position I think it's important to get one. 1st baseman and corner outfielders are a dime a dozen, C, 2B and CF are not.
Of course I use that philosophy in fantasy baseball and usually am second to last.
organizational depth
I really hope that BB can pile up a whole bunch of A-AA level kids with a lot of upside in trades involving Blanton, Street, Ellis, Embree, etc. Wouldn't it be great to have a surplus of ML-ready talent at certain positions at the time we are again ready to contend? If we had that surplus, we could trade from a position of strength, using players who are blocked in the organization anyway to acquire the last few pieces in a championship puzzle. We can only do that if have loaded teams at Stockton, Midland, and Sacramento that are developing the next generation of A's for our enjoyment. I, for one, will root just as hard for all the "Baby A's" this year as I will for the real ones! Oakland/Fremont in '11/'12!
I respectfully disagree
I'm amazed at how people will praise anything that Beane does, simply because Beane has done it. At least, that's the only explanation I can come up that makes any sense at all for why otherwise intelligent, highly baseball-aware people continue to praise this trade. Above, you said:
By getting 5-6 players that profile as at least average major leaguers as opposed to 1 or 2 that are seen as future stars, Beane has not only diffused the risk involved with prospect development but has exponentially increased the future resources and level of competitiveness of the major league team by strengthening the organizational depth chart and establishing cost-control over a wide range of positions. In essence, Beane traded three seasons of cost control in one area (starting pitching) for 6+ years of cost control in several areas (starting pitching, outfield and corner infield).
I think you are missing the point entirely. By getting multiple players, it's true, the farm system's "portfolio" of talent is diversified, so there isn't one guy everything depends on. At the same time, Beane AMPLIFIED the risk by getting players who are much further away from the bigs. How many guys are "plus tools" guys at the single-A level? And since when does having such guys translate to "6+ years of cost control in several areas"? Cost controlled minor league players, sure, if that's your goal.
If one or more of these guys pan out and/or if Danny Haren tanks for whatever reason, the trade may look good in the future, but right now make no mistake: though these youngsters may have "high upside" or even a relatively high "expected value," they also come with a huge variance in terms of that expected value. I don't see how you can get around that being an intrinsic part of such a distant prospect.
I liked the Hudson and Mulder trades because the expected value of the players Beane got in return was high. True, Chucky T was a complete bust and Meyer's not looking good, but a) their expected value was considerable, and b) the failure of such advanced prospects just highlights all the more the tenuous nature of talent and the extremely complex process involved in achieving a foothold in the majors. I'm not at all convinced that the risk-adjusted value of this batch of former snakes is anywhere near the expected value of Dan Haren.
I'm still staring, trying to see what y'all are seeing, but the emperor still looks pretty dang threadbare from where I stand.
by BerkeleyDawg on Dec 20, 2007 11:02 PM PST reply actions
Well, apparently you just have
a much more negative view of prospects than most people, I guess.
Look, even if the package doesn't match Haren's value qua value, if the utility it does provide comes at a better time for the team (i.e. during a playoff push) it still might be worth more.
The actual question of whether the prospect package will exceed Haren in value is basically unanswerable at this point. Ultimately I've concluded that I think it will. But that's a personal opinion-- there's no way to tell. The key point here-- the reason people are presumptively in favor of it-- is the above. Rebuilding means trading current value for future value (and hopefully less current value for more future value, playing on the fact that talent is more valuable to a contender than to a non-contender). That's how it is now, and how it always will be. Is that future value indefinite? Of course it is, but there's no way to avoid that.
This deal is not unlike the Huddy deal.
By your own admission you liked the Hudson deal. Well, the Haren deal is quite similar to that deal, only better, especially for the long-term health of the organization.
In the Hudson deal, the A's netted a lefty-swinging five-tool outfielder who was presumably close-to-major league ready (Thomas), a polished lefty starter about a season away from being major league ready (Meyer) and a major league ready bullpen arm (Cruz).
In this Haren trade, the A's netted a lefty-swinging, five-tool outfielder who is about half a season away from being major league ready (Gonzalez), a polished lefty starter about two seasons away from the major leagues (Anderson), a lefty starter with major league experience (Eveland), another lefty starter about major league ready (Smith), a 21 year old prospect who has already hit 51 homeruns in his pro career, and an all-around excellent outfield prospect about a season away from the majors.
You make it seem like these players that the A's got for Haren are all totally unproven, 18-year old rookie league players that we won't see pay dividends until next decade when in fact, most of them will, arguably, be major league ready sometime next season.
Sure, they could all fall apart before they even make their major league debuts or shortly thereafter like every player the A's got in return for Huddy did, but that's the point of diversifying the return and getting back as many players with high upsides as possible.
Even if you're really stingy with projections and very conservative with your optimism for these particular players, it's hard to imagine a scenario where all six of the players fail to make an impact of some sort in the major leagues. Even if say, just two of the six players make it to majors and give the team a couple of seasons of league average production at the major league minimum salary, the organization is coming out ahead in the long run, since even league average players are being paid tens of millions of dollars in this market.
Trends
I agree with Taj that it's a reflection of Beane shifting his demands and interests to something that is seen as less desirable on the market.
Everything that all of us read - mlbtraderumors, team blogs, BPro, etc. - practically OBSESSES over the same 5-10 prospect names. How many times have all of us, collectively, read the names Bucholz, Lester, Ellsbury, Hughes, Chamberlain, Adam Jones, Balentien, Clement in the last two months?
You've know we've gone to far when the Yankees' top three prospects are actually referred to as a "Holy Trinity". Christ.
I hear the same 8-10 names so much that it makes me sick. I think the "Internet buzz" of fans and media actually does have at least a little bit of ripple effect on how front offices value their guys. When the reality is, those 8-10 guys are good...but to consider them "untouchable" and ALL other minor league packages "subpar" is really, really off-base.
There's plenty of scenarios where Phil Hughes will always be a 4.00 ERA AL pitcher, Ellbury will top out as an .800 OPS guy, Jones' plate discipline comes back to bite him at the ML level.
Those 8-10 names will not end up having the best 8-10 careers of all the players currently in the minors. In fact, it won't be close. Maybe 2 of them will...and it would almost a crapshoot at this point to guess which two.
They're still just prospects. The most-hyped prospects often don't end up justifying the hype.
In a small market, if the alternative was getting 1 Adam Jones for Blanton, or 1 (Insert your favorite minor leaguer here) for Haren, you SHOULD prefer to get 5-6 slightly lower upside, less sexy players in return. The reason why is that Free Agent classes will only continue to get shittier and more expensive, and the A's will not want to ever again need to fill a void that way. The only way you can guarantee you won't need to is to have average depth everywhere - and have the best 40-man roster in the game, top to bottom.
When the fringes of our 40-man roster are occupied by guys like Eveland (just an example, and maybe a bad one, but you see the point), instead of Hiram Bocachicas, the A's will have the best depth in the game. If your entire 40-man roster is filled with medium-ceiling, 0-6 service time guys, you can do that, and do it incredibly cheaply.
Here's two "pros" to getting a prospect haul of 5-6 guys rather than one "stud" and improving your depth:
a.) You don't need to rush the guys you do get. The A's could keep Gonzales, or even Barton, in the minors for another season, force them to prove they can OPS .900 or better for a full season in AAA, and continue this tactic with each of their prospects. Then, when those guys slump, they can send them down, instead of feeling handicapped by a lack of depth at the position. They can effectively have enough depth that they delay the arbitration/free agency launches of each of their guys another season or two. We'd rather have Barton's age 28 season under cost control rather than his age 22 - especially considering we won't win anything next year. This isn't suggesting you screw with guys - it's just saying that you have the luxury of promoting on performance (a full season of .900 OPS in AAA, or hell, maybe two - that's why Ryan Howard still makes less than 1.1 million a year), rather than faith.
b.) Call me Sigmund, but I think there's got to be some psychological baggage that comes along with being the one prize return in a deal that netted a Haren/Mulder/Hudson type player. All of your minor league teammates, and probably most of the minor league fans, know that "somebody thought THAT guy was worth Dan Haren." That's a lot of pressure for a 21-year-old to carry. I'd rather spread that over 4-5 lower-level guys who don't get the scrutiny placed on them as much, so that they can have the typical growing pains without the microscope.
This is why I'd expect Blanton to get traded for 4-5 single A or AA guys, too. They don't need to take up a 40-man roster spot yet, their names aren't in every Internet prospect column, their teams don't overvalue them as much as they do the "big 8-10", and they diversify the A's risk.
by notsellingjeans on Dec 21, 2007 10:31 AM PST reply actions
fantastic post
I think some of us have been thinking alike, but no one up until now has expressed the argument so well...
I don't think there's any question
but that media buzz over prospects has made a huge, huge difference in their valuation by front offices. In the old days, if Oakland suggested a Blanton for Jones swap, Oakland would have been panned for selling off a proven player. Now, it's Seattle that takes the heat for giving up "upside."
We may see a lot more "Operation Shutdowns" in coming years, when Beane et al deliberately avoid expressing any interest in a player until the last possible moment to avoid exposing him to any media scrutiny.
I think this offseason might be a bit of a check on NY and Boston's prospect fetishism. It's clear that no one else values their prospects as highly as they do; the rebuilding Twins and A's both avoided them in making deals with other small-market clubs. Santana is proving impossible to get without Boston offering up 2 of their top 3 prospects.
Good Post
The financial point is a good one, too.
Look at a team like Cleveland for an example of a farm system that has been able to produce quality players at nearly every position, and how that has allowed them a very strong team at a low price.
Sure, it is very expensive to get even above average players via FA, but signing decent back of the rotation starters and quality backups adds up, too.
Guys like Dana Eveland, Chris Carter, and Aaron Cunningham, assuming they develop into MLB-worthy players, can save the team maybe $10m per year if only they each prove as valuable as Scutaro.
Young, decent, cost-controlled players cannot be undervalued. When guys like GMJ receive $10m per, the value of MLB-worthy cost-controlled players becomes obvious. Stocking the team full of cheap, average players is in fact a winning strategy, so long as we have a few stars to complement them.
great post
would you say that also further limits suitable trade partners, or expands that list? my initial reaction is that it will make it more difficult to find a good deal for Blanton.
I'd say it expands the list ...
When other GMs are knocking down their doors to try to swipe their top prospects, I suspect plenty of GMs will be relieved to find a potential partner that is willing to look at other options.
on top of which ...
there are only 8 teams or so that have one of the top 10-12 prospects, so it immediately more than triples the potential size of the pool.
Yeah
I think it definitely expands the pool of trading partners.
It's a win-win for both parties: Beane gets more players in the deal, because they are "under the radar" prospects who aren't publicized.
The opposing GM saves face with his fan base, because he doesn't lose the ONE prospect that even the casual fan of that team has heard of (Tim Lincecum last spring, Jones, Jay Bruce, etc.).
95-98%(?) of the fan base hasn't heard of the names he's giving away to Beane (assuming the top prospect isn't in it), so who cares if it's four no-names or five? 95% of the public won't think any less of the deal.
by notsellingjeans on Dec 21, 2007 2:03 PM PST up reply actions
5 players with a 10% chance of stardom
is far more politically correct than 1 player with a 50% chance.
I think this is where some of the critics of the Haren deal misanalyze it. It's not that Beane bought six guys who are (or will become) league average. It's that he bought six guys whose median outcome may be league average. (Obviously I'm oversimplifying here; some are probably a little above, some probably below.) The likelihood of producing a star from this package might well be higher than the likelihood of producing a star from, say, Hughes/Horne/Tabata, even if the odds of any one of those players becoming a star is greater.
In other words
Lets say for arguments sake you can break all prospects up into 3 categories: 1st tier, 2nd tier, and 3rd tier.
The 1st tier are the top 15% as seen in the eyes of the media and scouting community (mlbtraderumors, team blogs, BPro, etc.). These are the Ellsburys, Clements and Lesters of the world.
The 2nd tier are all the folks in the 30-85 percentile
And the 3rd tier is anyone below that.
Thing is, most of the players who play in the major leagues are in the 2nd tier. Some might argue that this is obvious because this group has the highest number of players in it. But its worth taking a second look in my opinion.
Most "experts", if asked right now who they would bet on to be regular pros are all going to bet on that top 15%, after all, that’s why they put them there. But history of shown us that those "experts" are always wrong. They actually fail miserably every year. This creates an inefficiency in the market. After all, it is almost guaranteed that less than half of that top 15% of players will actually be productive major leaguers.
So where do the players come from to fill that void that the top tier could not fill? For the most part its from the 2nd tier (and sometimes from the 3rd tier, i.e. Mike Piazza). So really what we are talking about is an undervaluation of the 2nd tier players, which is why we're seeing Billy go after more 2nd tier players rather than a few 1st tier players.
Makes sense to me.
by GusanoQuemador on Dec 21, 2007 2:18 PM PST up reply actions
Well, and factors we aren't privy to
What's this guy's work ethic? Even more importantly, what will his work ethic be like after he makes the first one million dollars of his life? How will he respond to more scrutiny and athletic adversity than he's ever faced at any other time in his life? Does he hate being around the typical A's team dynamic (mostly young, college-educated white guys), or will he fit right in?
Considering his mediocre athleticism, I'm guessing Mike Piazza had a great work ethic to become the hitter that he did.
Experts evaluate and measure the things that can be evaluated and measured, and sometimes ignore what they cannot.
A slow 60 time or poor velocity might land a guy in that 2nd or 3rd tier you discussed. But it doesn't mean he can't out-perform many, many first-tier guys at the top of that prospect list over the lifetime of his career.
by notsellingjeans on Dec 21, 2007 2:42 PM PST up reply actions
Not to mention
the psychological effect of being a "top prospect." You hit on this briefly, but sometimes just predicting that a kid will be a stud, can actually change things.
We see this in the stock market as well. My previous employer, a money manager on the peninsula, used to plot predictions from all the experts as to when (in months) a bull or bear market will begin. He used to actually jump in to the market on the exact month that none of the experts predicted. And he was and still is very successful (though not due to this strategy alone).
by GusanoQuemador on Dec 21, 2007 3:01 PM PST up reply actions
speaking of predicted studs
I believe this is baseballgirl's theory about Bobby Crosby. Son of a major-leaguer, stud all his life, just can't make himself humble enough to change his swing to what it needs to be.
by vk on Dec 21, 2007 4:40 PM PST up reply actions
the ultimate cant-miss prospect
...was Beane himself, one upon a time. And he missed--badly. So many things go into success and failure, and these things are hard to quantify. That's why I'm glad BB went with the "quantity" shotgun approach. Pile up 12-15 strong prospects with our trade bait and wait for them to develop. Perhaps in 5 years we'll be in the same position AZ is in today, with the ability to trade "cant-miss" prospects like Gonzalez because they are blocked in the roster by someone even better (Upton). The flexibility to make those kind of trades without losing key pieces of the team could allow us to acquire the final pieces to the 2012 championship puzzle, and without a loaded farm system that cannot happen...
agree with everything in principle, but ...
... regarding (a), I don't know that Beane is as far down that road to commitment to flexible usage of roster depth as we'd all think or prefer him to be.
Granted, recent benchers haven't been as strong/deep as what you envision the A's roster being like in x number of years, but the A's have had plenty of opportunity to plug cheap replacement-level (or near-RL) players in for expensive sunk-cost established veterans -- and they haven't done so. They've had plenty of opportunities to run true or modified platoons -- and they haven't done so.
One question
Do you believe that players do not need to play in MLB to improve? Do you believe that there is no difference in terms of how a prospect can improve / learn between terrorising the minors and playing in MLB?
Also, letting Ryan Howard rot in the minors was not a wise decision for the Phillies. While Howard was terrorising the minors, the Phillies were paying Jim Thome. If they had promoted Howard, the money they spent on Thome could have been spent elsewhere.
The same applies to Chase Utley. While Utley was terrorising the minors, the Philies were paying big bucks to David Bell to suck at 3b, instead of letting Utley play at 2b, moving Placido Polanco from 2b to supplant Bell at 3b.
Well...
Amongst players who have demonstrated that they are ready for a full big-league opportunity - think Ryan Howard in '05 - you're probably right, there is a slight difference in the speed at which they develop; they'll be learning more perhaps if they are promoted to the bigs, rather than repeating and dominating AAA.
But a bigger factor in their development is simply another year of muscle growth, maturity, repetition, and age. Whether he played two years of AAA or was rushed to the bigs, Ryan Howard was going to be a better hitter at age 25 than he was at age 23.
Why? Because 9 out of 10 hitters are. Between age 23 and 25, almost any hitter benefits from the two extra years of body development/muscle growth, added reps/experience, and maturity.
The money the Phils were paying on Thome at that point was still money very well spent - Thome was having terrific seasons.
Bottom line, I think it's had to argue with this:
*The Royals brought Alex Gordon up from AA this year in an obvious non-playoff season so that he could post below-average 3b numbers at age 22. Because of this, he'll be a free agent (or signed to a huge extension) after his 27th birthday - right after entering his peak.
*Conversely, The Phillies will have Howard under cost control throughout his ENTIRE peak. He made less than 400K in his age 26 season in '06, when he hit 58 homers. Last year, he made 900K - a record for players with less than 2 years of service - and OPS'd .976 despite a rough start.
Philadelphia still has four more years of him under cost control...between ages 28-31, which are very often four of the best years of a player's career.
In my mind, Philly's incredibly patient handling of Howard is exactly the model to follow for a team with depth...and the Royals' decision with Gordon is a cautionary tale. In 10 years people will probably note that the Phillies paid for only the six best years of his career - age 26-31. He entered the bigs as he was peaking, and signed an FA deal with another team just as he entered a decline.
Gordon, meanwhile, will play most of his best baseball after his 27th birthday...for another team that can afford his FA sticker price.
I see your point Rfloh, but I disagree that the Phil's strategy wasn't wise.
by notsellingjeans on Dec 22, 2007 7:13 AM PST up reply actions
and I think Beane fells the same way
If the OF ends up being deep enough that Gonzalez stays down for another season, even two, that's a good thing. Make him prove that he can OPS .900 for a full season at Sacramento. If he barely gets there, and it's BABIP luck-induced, make him do it again. We're not going to make the playoffs during the window that he's in the minors, anyway. I'd much rather have his 25-30 year old seasons as our starting CFer than 22-27.
On that note: 1.) There's no way he opens the season with the big club next year. 2.) There's no way Swisher is getting dealt.
When people like Buster Olney write stuff like that, it's because they don't understand baseball economics well enough. All they see is "the A's acquired an outfielder - they must have too many now."
by notsellingjeans on Dec 22, 2007 7:23 AM PST up reply actions
the only problem with this argument is that ...
... neither Buck nor Suzuki (nor, really, anyone, for that matter) was promoted because of a lack of league-average depth. Most promotions to Oakland during the last 4-5 years have been due to injuries. Unless you're arguing that we should have had a few more McClain/Bowen/Piatt/Koonce/DJ types hanging around to clog up the earned progress of Buck and Suzuki.
Buck played himself into position to be promoted because of his outstanding spring, and then stepped in to the opportunity created by the injuries. Suzuki pretty much outlasted all the other A's catching prospects, and Kendall's utter suckitude (and Beane's recognition he was going to have to sell off Kendall for pennies on the dollar, and quick) was what "forced" Beane to bring Suzuki up.
I grant the overall point of Beane moving toward stockpiling a lot of surer-thing, lower-cieling players -- but he's pretty much been doing that the last 5 years anyway. The issues are that the club needs to figure out a way to keep its players (especially the premiere ones) healthy, and to develop some players with more upside while not compromising the team's overall risk profile.
With Howard,
you appear to be arguing that the only thing that matters, is that he is cheap throughout his peak. You appear to be arguing that the only thing that matters is cost control in the future.
Again, while Howard was pointlessly terrorising other players in the minors, the Phillies were paying Jim Thome.
At age 24, in 2004, Howard had an OPS of 1021 in AA, and 956 in AAA. He then OPSed 897 in MLB in a short stint in Sept, an OPS+ of 122. He was clearly ready by then.
In 2004, the Philles paid Jim Thome $10.5M.
In 2004, the Phillies missed the WC by 6 games.
They had a HUGE GAPING hole in CF: Marlon Byrd OPS+ of 54!. When Marlon Byrd wasn't playing Doug Glanville was. Doug Glanville: OPS+ 30! 30!!11. Collectively those 2 guys were about 30-40 runs below average. About 3-4 wins.
Their starting pitching was VERY POOR. They sucked. They did not have a single guy with an ERA+ above 100 who also pitched more than 150 IP. Not one. Their pitching was saved by their relievers.
Imagine if instead of spending $10.5M on Jim Thome and Ryan Howard, they had spent that $10.5M on Ryan Howard and a league average CF. Or on Ryan Howard and a decent starting pitcher.
Yes, they saved money in the future. But there was an opportunity cost to doing that. They did not make the playoffs in 2004. No revenues from the playoffs. No increased fan interest, and increased revenues in the following season as a result of making the playoffs.
In 2005, Howard terrorised the minors again: an OPS of 1157. He was finally promoted after Thome missed lots of time due to injury.
In 2005, the Phillies paid Thome $11.5M.
In 2005. the Phillies won 88 games 2 games out of the NL East crown, 1 game out of the WC. They finished behind the Astros by 1 game. 1.
In 2005, their gaping hole was at 3b and 1b. David Bell: OPS+ 72. Jim Thome, OPS+ 85.
In those 160 PAs of 85 OPS+, Thome was about 3 runs below an average hitter. Not a big deal, you say. Howard in 348 PAs was about 14 runs above average. If Thome's OPS+ of 85 was replaced with Howard's OPS+ of 133, the difference would be about 10 runs. About a win.
Also, that situation could have easily been solved by dumping David Bell, replacing him with Placido Polanco who was at 2b, and replacing Polanco with Chase Utley, who like Howard rotted in the minors.
I'm not even taking into account what the Phillies could have done with the $11.5M they paid Thome.
So, in return for saving on the future salaries of Howard and Utley, the opportunity cost was missing the playoffs by one game. ONE game. No revenues from the playoffs as a result. No increased fan interest and increased revenues in the following season.
As for whether players need to play in the majors to improve, there are also plenty of players who have destroyed the minors, not been promoted, allowed to continue to destroy the minors, only to stagnate and struggle when they have finally hit the majors; see the various Giants position players: Linden, Niekro et al.
Also, you are here assuming that all players are the same. That every player developes similarly regardless of the external stimulus.
I also want to point out that this point in your original post "the reason why is that Free Agent classes will only continue to get shittier and more expensive, and the A's will not want to ever again need to fill a void that way.", also applies to star players. In fact it applies EVEN MORE SO to star players. Star and super star players are MUCH MORE difficult to acquire in FA compared to average players. If the A's are content to develope average to above average players, where are the stars going to come from?
Also, there is the case of Hanley Ramirez
Mediocre in the minors, a terror in the majors.
You seem to be assuming here
that the Phillies could have just dumped Thome's salary at will. I mean, it's possible that they could have, but you can't just take that for granted.
2005 is a different story, but it would have been insane for the Phillies to trade Thome for a bag of baseballs and promote Ryan Howard from AA to start 2004. They could (perhaps) have dealt Thome at the deadline, but they still wouldn't be able to use the money on a pitcher until the next season.
There's good reason for hanging on to vets even when you think you might get slightly better production from a minor leaguer. If the vet struggles, you can always call up the rookie. If you trade the vet and the rookie struggles, well, you're just s*** out of luck.
I'm saying that
they should have dumped either Thome or Howard. Having 2 great players at one position is inefficient. It may save you money in the future, but it will cost you money in the present. Yes, I wasn't clear about this in my post above, but my post was getting too long, so I stopped typing.
Keep Thome, trade Howard for a CF or a starting pitcher. Keep Howard, trade Thome.
Inefficient is not necessarily bad strategy
Is it inefficient for the Yankees to have Abreu, Damon and Matsui for three outfield spots? Hell yeah... but it's better than having Abreu, Damon and Craig Monroe for actually winning baseball games.
I'd be much more comfortable with a team entering the season with Thome and AAA-Howard backing him up than just Howard. This is not to say that they shouldn't have explored options with regard to trading one of them, but if the offers weren't there, they weren't there. I don't really know anything about the situation, so maybe they weren't.
Howard was terrorising the minors
Just going on my own opinion...
...I kind of already view Carlos Gonzalez as, "The guy we got for Haren".
by Travis Buck Nuckin on Dec 23, 2007 11:39 PM PST up reply actions
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